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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Michael D. Gilbert*
Judicial independence is a cornerstone of American constitutionalism. It empowers judges to check the other branches of government and resolve cases
impartially and in accordance with law. Yet independence comes with a hazard. Precisely because they are independent, judges can ignore law and pursue
private agendas.
For two centuries, scholars have debated those ideas and the underlying tradeoff: independence versus accountability. They have achieved little consensus,
in part because independence raises difficult antecedent questions. We cannot
decide how independent to make a judge until we agree on what a judge is
supposed to do. That depends on one’s views about complicated issues like
minority rights, the determinacy of law, and the nature of legalism itself.
These complications have paralyzed the debate.
This Article presents a way forward. It reduces the debate about independence
to a small set of intuitive parameters and shows how they interact. The result
is a framework for identifying the optimal degree of judicial independence.
The framework transcends the thorny issues bogging down the debate by allowing scholars with diverse views and methodologies to input whatever assumptions they like and get an answer to the question “how independent
should judges be?”
This framework generates important insights. It shows that independence can
implicate a new and fundamental trade-off. Independent judges make some
nonlegalistic decisions, and each such decision imposes a high cost on society.
Dependent judges make more nonlegalistic decisions, but each imposes a low
cost on society. The framework also shows that society may prefer a dependent
judge to adjudicate minority rights and that the determinacy of law can be
irrelevant to the choice between an independent and a dependent judge. Finally, it shows that the debate rests on deep and contestable assumptions
about the value of law. The question is not whether the legalistic decisions that
independence is supposed to facilitate are better than nonlegalistic alternatives. The question is “how much better?”

* Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful for comments
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Introduction
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Iowa unanimously held that same-sex
couples have a right to marry under the state constitution.1 A year later,
Iowans voted out of office three justices who joined that opinion.2 In the
months leading up to the vote, out-of-state groups spent nearly one million
1. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
2. Grant Schulte, Iowa Ousts 3 Justices After Gay-Marriage Ruling, USA Today, Nov. 4,
2010, at A8, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2010-11-03-gay-marriage-iowa-election_N.htm.
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dollars on political ads targeting the justices.3 As that storm brewed, the U.S.
Supreme Court confronted Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.4 That case involved an elected judge who, after refusing to recuse himself, cast the decisive vote in a multimillion-dollar contract case in favor of the principal
supporter of his election campaign.5 Over a vigorous dissent, the Supreme
Court held that the judge’s refusal to recuse violated the Constitution.6
These two events energized the debate over judicial elections.7 They also
implicated the issue anchoring that debate: judicial independence.
Judicial independence is a cornerstone of American constitutionalism,
and it has long been a source of controversy. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton argued that independence “is the best expedient which can
be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws.”8 According to Chief Justice John Marshall,
“[T]he greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful
and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary.”9
But there is another side to the story. As the Anti-Federalist Brutus wrote in
1788, “[When] power is lodged in the hands of men independent of the
people, and of their representatives . . . no way is left to controul them.”10
3. Linda Casey, Independent Expenditure Campaigns in Iowa Topple Three High Court
Justices, Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.followthe
money.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=440.
4. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
5. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872–76.
6. Id. at 886.
7. For a small slice of the literature produced in the wake of these decisions, see, for
example, Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice: Can They Live Together?, 52
Ariz. L. Rev. 207 (2010); Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of
Caperton, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 80 (2009); Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What
Too Few Accept, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (2009); Sandra Day O’Connor, Remark, “Choosing
(and Recusing) Our State Court Justices Wisely”, 99 Geo. L.J. 151 (2010); and Ronald D. Rotunda, Hartman Hotz Lecture, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 1
(2011).
8. The Federalist No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
9. John Marshall, Speech on Dec. 11, 1829, in Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–30, at 608, 619 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1830)
(emphasis added).
10. Brutus, Essay XV (1788), reprinted in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 437,
442 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Two centuries have hardly altered the public rhetoric. In
recent years, former Republican president George W. Bush and former Democratic house
speaker Nancy Pelosi have affirmed their commitments to judicial independence. See David D.
Kirkpatrick, After DeLay Remarks, Bush Says He Supports ‘Independent Judiciary’, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 9, 2005, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/09/politics/09judges.html
?_r=1; Nancy Pelosi, Op-Ed., Respecting the Constitution and the Role of the Supreme Court,
Chi. Trib., Apr. 19, 2012, at 19, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-19/
opinion/ct-perspec-0419-pelosi-20120419_1_judicial-review-federal-courts-supreme-court.
But not all politicians have followed suit. According to former Republican house speaker Newt
Gingrich, we “have judges who are dictatorial and arrogant, who pretend that they are the
dominant branch and who issue orders that clearly are against the Constitution.” Lucy
Madison, Gingrich: Congress, President Can Ignore Courts, Face the Nation (Oct. 9, 2011, 1:56
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This rhetoric captures a pair of enduring arguments. On the one hand,
independence insulates judges from outside pressures, and that empowers
them to interpret law impartially. That impartiality seems critical to the separation of powers and the rule of law generally.11 On the other hand, independence means little or no accountability. That seems antithetical to
democracy, and it might be dangerous, as judges can ignore law and pursue
personal agendas.12
The debate about independence has grown more complex over time. In
addition to the fundamentals—impartiality and accountability—judicial independence implicates at least three related issues. First, minority rights:
What minorities merit legal protection, how much, and what kind of judge
is best suited to the task? Second, the determinacy of law: How often does
law yield unique, correct answers, and what kind of judge will identify them?
Third, the nature of legalism itself: How exactly are judges supposed to resolve cases? As Fred Schauer has written, “[B]efore we can talk seriously
about how to select and retain judges, we must have an idea of what . . . they
ought to do.”13
These issues present a challenge for the study of judicial independence.
The central question seems simple: How independent should judges be? The
answer matters not only because it is intrinsically interesting but also because it could inform a variety of debates. Vast literatures—on the separation of powers,14 judicial selection mechanisms,15 judicial review and the
PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/10/09/ftn/
main20117838.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody.Gingrich suggested that such judges be
subpoenaed or even arrested. Lucy Madison, Gingrich: Gov’t Branches Should Rule 2 out of 3,
Face the Nation (Dec. 18, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_16257344825/gingrich-govt-branches-should-rule-2-out-of-3. Democratic president Barack
Obama has also challenged, or appeared to challenge, courts in recent years. See, e.g., Jeff
Mason, Obama Takes a Shot at Supreme Court over Healthcare, Reuters (Apr. 2, 2012, 6:45
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/02/us-obama-healthcare-idUSBRE8310WP2012
0402 (reporting on President Obama’s public statement that a decision by the Supreme Court
to overturn the Affordable Care Act would constitute “judicial activism”); Terry Moran, State
of the Union: The Slam, the Scowl and the Separation of Powers, ABC News (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/State_of_the_Union/state-of-the-union-president-obama-justice-alito-political-theater/story?id=9688639 (discussing President Obama’s “extraordinary
step of bashing a decision of the Supreme Court in his State of the Union address”).
11. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1571, 1571 (1988) (“[A]n independent judiciary, unco-opted by the political aims of the ruling
majority and willing to defend individuals’ rights against government abuse, seems crucial to
liberal democracy.”).
12. See id. (“[T]he ability of an elite corps of judges to wield enormous power that is
unchecked by popular opinion and criticism seems to contradict liberal democracy’s fundamental premise.”).
13.
(1988).

Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1717, 1732

14. See, e.g., Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 108 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 43, 51
(2003) (discussing the “judicial independence ‘problem’ caused by electing judges”).
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countermajoritarian difficulty,16 judicial decisionmaking,17 statutory interpretation,18 transnational courts,19 democratization,20 corruption,21 economic development,22 and freedom itself23—are rooted in conceptions of
and assumptions about judicial independence. But we cannot answer the
central question and inform those debates without first confronting hard
questions about accountability, determinacy, minority rights, and so forth.
Those issues are thorny. They have positive and normative components, and
scholars strongly disagree on them.
This Article presents a way forward. I develop a framework for identifying the socially optimal degree of judicial independence. By “socially optimal
degree” I mean the degree that would maximize aggregate utility. Utilitarianism, like all other conceptions of social welfare, is contestable, but it is
intuitive and widely understood, and I use it for purposes of illustration.
The framework can accommodate many different conceptions of social
welfare.
The key insight is that we do not need to resolve the thorny, underlying
issues to make progress. Rather, we can stitch those issues into a logical
sequence and replace them with placeholders. The result is a general decisionmaking framework. One can input into the framework whatever assumptions one likes—about the effect of independence on impartiality and
16. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons,
Direct Democracy, 1996 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 477, 482 (“[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty is
usually posited as a concern with unelected judges who have life tenure . . . displacing the
choices of elected representatives.”).
17. See, e.g., Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 247 (2004) (finding that elected
judges impose harsher sentences as their elections draw nearer).
18. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1073, 1120–21 (1992) (stating that “[o]ne obvious solution” to the countermajoritarian difficulty “is to constrain the judge,” which some argue can
be accomplished in statutory interpretation cases by strict adherence to text).
19. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2005) (arguing that dependent international tribunals are superior
to independent ones).
20. See, e.g., Robert M. Howard & Henry F. Carey, Is an Independent Judiciary Necessary
for Democracy?, 87 Judicature 284 (2004); Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and
Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 605 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Mikael Priks, Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies, 12 Econ. Governance 75
(2011) (examining the relationship between judicial independence and corruption at different
levels of government).
22. See, e.g., Daniel M. Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development, 19 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 427 (2007) (reviewing literature on independence and economic growth); Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The
Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England, 7 Am. L. & Econ.
Rev. 1 (2005) (examining the relationship between judicial independence and equity markets).
23. Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. Pol. Econ. 445, 445
(2004) (“We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and
constitutional review are associated with greater freedom.”).
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accountability, about the meaning of legalism, and so forth—and it will
yield an answer to the question “how independent should judges be?”
The framework cannot provide a universal answer to the question. Its
product depends on one’s subjective inputs. But it still makes many contributions. It organizes the swirling debate about independence into a small set
of intuitive arguments. It shows how those arguments, which are usually
pursued in isolation, interact. It provides a common device that scholars
with diverse methodologies and varying opinions on the underlying questions can use and adapt to different legal, political, and institutional settings.
It identifies the optimal degree of independence for any set of assumptions,
and conversely, it identifies the assumptions that must hold for any particular degree of independence to be optimal. This last point is important. Many
observers take strong positions on the “right” degree of independence, but
they fail to understand the necessary conditions on which their positions
rest.
This Article also challenges old ideas and generates new ones. I will preview three of the conclusions. First, I reduce the debate about judicial independence to a fundamental trade-off. Not the usual one—more
independence implies less accountability, and vice versa24—but one that is
deeper and more precise. Under plausible conditions, an independent judge
will make more legalistic decisions, and fewer nonlegalistic decisions, than a
dependent judge. But each nonlegalistic decision will impose a high cost on
society because independent judges’ decisions are incongruent with the policy preferences of a representative citizen. A dependent judge will make
fewer legalistic, and more nonlegalistic, decisions than an independent
judge. But each nonlegalistic decision will impose a low cost on society because dependent judges are more congruent with a representative citizen.
We need not agree on what exactly constitutes a legalistic decision to recognize and appreciate that trade-off.
Second, I shed light on the relationship between independence and minority rights. Many argue that independent judges are more apt to protect
minority rights.25 I show that even if that is true, and even if protecting
minorities is very beneficial for society, we may still be better off with dependent judges. A few more decisions protecting minority rights may not
compensate for other, nonlegalistic decisions by independent judges whose
policy views depart substantially from those of a representative citizen.
Third, I address the relationship between independence and the determinacy of law. Conventional wisdom suggests that as law becomes less determinate and judges by necessity exercise more discretion, accountability
becomes more important.26 I show that this is not always so. In many circumstances, the determinacy of law is irrelevant to the choice of judge.
24. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 271 (2008)
(“Often, the debate over judicial selection methods is distilled to a single tradeoff: independence versus accountability.”).
25. See infra Section I.B.3.
26. See infra Section I.B.4.
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This Article concludes by suggesting that the ideas presented here are
not limited to judges and judicial independence. They can be generalized to
a wide variety of legal actors, including administrative agencies and prosecutors, for whom independence is relevant.
Before proceeding, I offer some clarifications about the project. This
Article examines the concept of judicial independence rather than the institutions, including selection methods, that affect it. This approach focuses
the analysis, albeit at the cost of concreteness. Also, this Article has descriptive and normative elements, but it is not predictive. It is descriptive insofar
as it identifies plausible relationships between independence and various
characteristics of a judge. It is normative insofar as it sheds light on the
question of when should judges be independent. For the Article to be predictive, however, political actors who design judicial institutions would have to
aim to maximize social welfare, defined here as aggregate utility. Most political actors probably do not do that. Consequently, I do not purport to make
good predictions about when politicians will make judges independent.27
I proceed as follows. Part I provides background on the judicial independence debate. Part II develops the framework. Part III uses the framework to derive new insights. Part IV sketches some implications for law and
policy.
I. Background on Judicial Independence
This Part defines judicial independence and identifies the principal arguments for and against it. My objective is to summarize the literature and
set the stage for my contributions, which come mostly in Part II and beyond. I say “mostly” because I am doing some original work here. First, I am
reducing a large literature to a handful of spare, discrete arguments, and I
am doing so in a way that will feed naturally into the framework I develop in
Part II. Others may approach the literature differently and prefer different
terms. Second, I am deepening the debate by suggesting that independence

27. On the question of when self-interested political actors will make judges independent, see, for example, Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies 25 (2003);
Martin Shapiro, Courts 32–35 (1981); The Politics of Judicial Independence (Bruce
Peabody ed., 2011); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 712 (2004); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 91, 100–01 (2000); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975); J. Mark Ramseyer, The
Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. Legal Stud. 721 (1994);
James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative–Judicial Interaction, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 84, 95 (2001); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine
of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 Int’l Rev. L. &
Econ. 349 (1993); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. Legal Stud. 59 (2003); and Georg Vanberg, Legislative–Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review, 45 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 346, 347 (2001).

582

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:575

affects two distinct and precise characteristics of a judge: the judge’s propensity to act in accordance with law and the judge’s congruence with mainstream values. These characteristics are often conflated, and distinguishing
them motivates much of the analysis. Finally, I am drawing out a question
that, though critical to the debate, is usually left unspoken: How valuable is
it for judges to act in accordance with law?
A. Defining Judicial Independence
Theodore Becker once decried that “[w]hat is accepted as a definition of
judicial independence is an occasional passing remark, a shrugging of the
shoulders, a ‘You know what I mean.’ ”28 Forty years later, his criticism has
lost force as scholars have developed rigorous definitions of the concept.29
Here, I draw from that work and offer my own definition of judicial independence. My definition is simple and reflective of the literature. I am not
trying to offer something new, just to pinpoint something old: the general
consensus about the core meaning of the term. I want to be clear about what
judicial independence signifies before turning to the debate it has sparked.
Judicial independence is a state in which a judge cannot be penalized,
and knows that he cannot be penalized, by other actors for his official decisions. He cannot receive a penalty such as a salary reduction, loss of his
judgeship, imprisonment, a foregone benefit, or any other harm. “Other actors” includes parties to a case, legislators, bureaucrats, voters, interest
groups, other judges,30 and so forth. “Official decisions” means decisions in
one’s professional capacity as a judge.
28. Theodore L. Becker, Comparative Judicial Politics 140 (1970).
29. For discussions and different uses of the term, see, for example, Gordon Bermant &
Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 835 (1995); Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 315 (1999); Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering
Judicial Independence, in Judicial Independence at the Crossroads 9 (Stephen B. Burbank
& Barry Friedman eds., 2002); Charles M. Cameron, Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell
It When You See It? And, Who Cares?, in Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, supra,
at 134; Tom S. Clark & Jeffrey K. Staton, Challenges and Opportunities of Judicial Independence
Research, L. & Cts., Summer 2011, at 10; Owen M. Fiss, Perspective, The Limits of Judicial
Independence, 25 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 57 (1993); Charles Gardner Geyh, The State of
the Onion: Peeling Back the Layers of America’s Ambivalence Toward Judicial Independence, 82
Ind. L.J. 1215 (2007); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 535 (1999); Daniel Klerman, Commentary, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72
S. Cal. L. Rev. 455 (1999); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?, in
Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, supra, at 45; Alex Kozinski, The Many Faces of
Judicial Independence, 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 861 (1998); Sanford Levinson, Identifying “Independence”, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1297 (2006); Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 697 (1995); Lydia Brashear Tiede,
Judicial Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood, 15 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 129
(2006); and Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence,
72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 625 (1999).
30. By including judges in the list, I mean to signal that I am concerned with the independence of individual judges vis-à-vis all other actors, not the independence of the judiciary
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I clarify with examples: If a judge can resolve a case on the basis of law,
and if he will not suffer any harm as a consequence, that is consistent with
judicial independence. If a judge can disregard law and resolve a case on the
basis of his personal preferences, and if he will suffer no harm for doing so,
that is consistent with judicial independence. If a judge cannot resolve a case
a particular way without risking removal from office, that is inconsistent
with judicial independence.
Under this definition, the independence of a judge and the popularity of
his decisions are unrelated. A judge can make politically popular decisions
and remain independent, so long as he would not suffer harm for different
decisions.
This definition distinguishes independence from impartiality. A judge
can be independent and, if he favors a litigant or disfavors a law or whatever
else, partial at the same time.31 Put differently, independence empowers
judges to act impartially, but it does not imply or require that they do so.32
Independence is continuous, not binary.33 Different factors—including
selection methods, salary protections, and term lengths—vest judges with
varying degrees of independence.34 The question, therefore, is not whether a
judge suffers any penalties or harm for his official decisions. Few, if any,
judges achieve complete independence.35 Rather, the question is “how much
harm does a judge suffer for his official decisions?” The lesser the harm, the
more independent the judge. The greater the harm, the more “dependent”
the judge.
To the extent judges are dependent, I assume, as does the rest of the
literature, that they are formally dependent on a public actor or set of actors.

as a whole. Of course, the two are related. See Burbank, supra note 29, at 340–49 (distinguishing between individual and institutional judicial independence). See generally John Ferejohn,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev.
353 (1999); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (2002).
31. This is a common but not universal approach, as some argue that independence
implies or requires impartiality. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 29, at 547 (“[T]he very architecture of the human mind poses a substantial threat to judicial independence as judges find
themselves in unconscious thrall to their past experiences.”).
32. See Becker, supra note 28, at 141 (“[M]uch independence may exist without much
impartiality and much impartiality may exist without much independence.”).
33. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 Geo. L.J. 965 (2007).
34. For discussion of such factors, see, for example, Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless
Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
1259, 1279–80 (2008); F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional
Change in the State Courts, 33 J. Legal Stud. 431 (2004); Jackson, supra note 33; McNollgast,
Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 105 (2006); Ramseyer,
supra note 27; and Stephenson, supra note 27.
35. See Burbank & Friedman, supra note 29, at 12 (“No American federal or state court
of which we are aware has ever enjoyed complete decisional independence . . . .”).
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In other words, the law makes them publicly accountable.36 A variety of institutions could facilitate that public accountability: executive or legislative
appointments,37 popular elections,38 the threat of recall,39 and so forth.40 The
exact institution or combination of institutions at issue is irrelevant for present purposes.
The effects of public accountability are uncertain. Such accountability
might cause judges to make decisions that reflect the preferences of a representative citizen, regardless of whether the law requires different decisions.41
It might cause judges to make decisions that reflect the preferences of narrow interest groups that can influence elections and other judicial selection
processes.42 It might cause judges to remain utterly faithful to the law, if that
is what the public wants, and to consider citizens’ preferences only in cases
where the law is ambiguous.43 Much of the debate about judicial independence grows from disagreements about the effects of public accountability.44
A judge can be independent even if the executive does not enforce his
decisions, so long as failure to enforce does not harm the judge.45 Likewise, a
judge can be independent even if the legislature changes the law to override
36. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm
of Political Rhetoric, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 911 (2006). People debate what judges should be
accountable for. See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 Ct. Rev. 118 (2011), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1680&context=facpub.
37. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor & RonNell Andersen Jones, Reflections on Arizona’s
Judicial Selection Process, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 15 (2008) (arguing that executive appointment facilitates accountability).
38. See, e.g., Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, In Defense of Judicial
Elections (2009) (arguing that elections facilitate accountability). But see Joseph R. Grodin,
Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1969 (1988) (criticizing retention elections).
39. See, e.g., There Goes the Judge: Women Rout a Rape-Condoning Wisconsin Jurist,
Time, Sept. 19, 1977, at 26 (reporting on a state court judge who was recalled from office after
setting free a rapist and stating, “[W]hether women like it or not, they are sex objects”).
40. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 33 (discussing accountability mechanisms for Article
III judges). See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection & Their Impact on
Judicial Independence, Daedalus, Fall 2008, at 86; Hanssen, supra note 34 (describing the
different procedures used to choose and retain state judges).
41. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 15, at 72 (criticizing judicial elections for “mak[ing]
judges no less subject to the influence of temporary majorities” than legislators and
executives).
42. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 Duke L.J.
623, 629 (2009) (finding evidence that “contributions from interest groups” to judges’ election
campaigns “are associated with increases in the probability that judges will vote for the litigants favored by those interest groups”).
43. See O’Connor & Jones, supra note 37, at 23 (arguing that public accountability can
and should cause judges to “apply[ ] the law fairly and impartially”).
44. See infra Sections I.B.1–2.
45. In practice, judges probably care if their decisions are enforced, and this probably
affects their behavior. For a discussion, see Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts & Congress Collide 51–111 (2006).
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his decisions, so long as override does not harm the judge.46 Judicial independence matters most, however, if some judicial decisions are enforced and
retained.47 In the United States and many other countries, it is safe to assume that they are enforced and retained, at least some of the time.
In a nutshell, that is the core meaning of judicial independence, the
concept around which the debate has swirled. Many scholars have gone from
the core to the periphery, drawing more distinctions and adding more layers
of complication,48 but that work is unnecessary for my purposes.
B. The Debate over Judicial Independence
President Woodrow Wilson once wrote, “[T]he struggle for constitutional government is a struggle for good laws, indeed, but also for intelligent, independent, and impartial courts.”49 In the century preceding him,
and in the hundred years since, many observers—including scholars, judges,
and Founding Fathers—have embraced that position.50 It rests on a set of
powerful, overlapping arguments.
First, judges cannot prevent the legislature and the executive from violating the law unless they are independent of those branches.51 Second,
judges cannot protect individual rights unless they are independent of the
actors violating the rights, whether public or private.52 Third, judges cannot
give force to private law norms, such as enforcement of contracts, unless
they are independent of persons interested in violating those norms.53 In
46. Cf. Seidman, supra note 11, at 1575 (“[E]ven relatively independent judges . . .
might nonetheless be held accountable if we restricted their power. This could be accomplished by permitting judicial decisions to be reversed by statute or popular
referendum . . . .”).
47. Burbank, supra note 29, at 323 (“[J]udicial independence . . . is meaningless unless
the executive branch is willing and able to enforce the orders of federal courts.”); see also
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 989, 994
(1996) (expressing similar ideas); Seidman, supra note 11, at 1575 (same).
48. See sources cited supra note 29.
49. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 17
(1908) (emphasis added).
50. For a concise tour of the two-century debate over life tenure, see Michael J. Mazza,
A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the Article III Judge, 39 Gonz. L. Rev. 131
(2003).
51. For early, classic expositions of this argument, see The Federalist No. 47, supra
note 8 (James Madison); Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 156–66 (Anne M. Cohler et
al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748); and 2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 722–23 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds.,
Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
52. Again, for early, classic expositions, see The Federalist No. 78, supra note 8 (Alexander Hamilton), and Letter from Andrew Jackson to Andrew J. Donelson (July 5, 1822) in 3
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson 167 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1928).
53. A vast literature develops these arguments. See, e.g., Amy B. Atchison et al., Judicial
Independence and Judicial Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 723
(1999); see also, e.g., Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, supra note 29 (including
Burbank, supra note 29, and other relevant contributions); Judicial Independence in the
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short, judicial independence is a means for achieving certain ends, especially
impartial adjudication, the rule of law, and the maintenance of constitutional values.54
But “[j]udicial independence is not an unalloyed good.”55 The same independence that empowers judges to check the other branches of government and apply the law also frees them to ignore the law and pursue private
agendas.56 Remember Brutus: when “power is lodged in the hands of men
independent of the people, and of their representatives . . . no way is left to
controul them.”57
Those dueling arguments—judges should be independent, but independence implies a dangerous lack of accountability58—underpin the debate. In
the following paragraphs, I examine these arguments and other elements of
the debate in some depth.
1. Propensity for Legalism
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued that without judicial independence, “it is scarce[ly] possible that justice should not frequently be
sacrificed to, what is vulgarly called, politics.”59 Over two centuries later, this
argument remains front and center in the debate. Public accountability will
subject judges to pressure from voters, politicians, interest groups, and so
forth. That will encourage judges to disregard law and make decisions to
satisfy those actors. In short, dependence undermines judges’ propensity to
Age of Democracy (Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien, eds., 2001) (including several
relevant contributions); Ervin, supra note 14, cited in Atchison et al., supra; Irving R. Kaufman,
The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 671 (1980), cited in Atchison et al.,
supra.
54. Again, a vast literature addresses these ideas. See Ferejohn, supra note 30, at 353–56;
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 30, at 965–76; sources cited supra note 53; see also Daniel B.
Rodriguez et al., The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 Emory L.J. 1455, 1479 (2010) (“[A]n independent judiciary is considered by many commentators . . . as a sine qua non for [the rule of
law].”); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law, in Relocating the Rule of
Law 3, 11 (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009) (“An institutionalised, independent
judiciary is crucial to both functions of the rule of law . . . .”); William C. Whitford, The Rule
of Law, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 723, 738 (“[J]udicial independence is widely seen as critically necessary to the effective implementation of [the rule of law].”); Zemans, supra note 29, at 631
(stating that “an independent judiciary” is a “necessity” for the rule of law).
55. Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J.
195, 217 (2003).
56. See Geyh, supra note 34, at 1260 (“[S]ome forms of independence from decisional
constraint, such as the freedom to decide cases for the benefit of friends or in exchange for
bribes, are antithetical to the rule of law . . . .”).
57. Brutus, Essay XV, supra note 10, at 442.
58. Seidman, supra note 11, at 1571–72 (“[V]irtually all defenses of judicial independence end in contradiction. . . . The ability of [independent] judges to transcend ordinary
politics (a good) is, differently characterized, the ability to exercise unchecked power (an
evil).”).
59.

2 Smith, supra note 51, at 722.
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act in accordance with law, or in my language, their propensity for legalism.
So goes a core argument in favor of making judges independent.60
One can easily imagine examples. Suppose a multimillion-dollar contract dispute arises in which one party happens to be among the governor’s
principal supporters. Or consider a dispute involving the pensions of
thousands of public employees. An independent judge probably would not
have a personal stake in either case, but a judge subject to reappointment or
reelection might. The latter judge might disregard law and make decisions to
satisfy political actors.61
Evidence supports this logic. The state court decision in Caperton appeared politically motivated, as an elected judge cast the decisive vote in
favor of the main supporter of his campaign.62 Discussing his judicial appointees, all of whom were subject to reappointment or reelection, California governor Gray Davis stated, “My appointees should reflect my views.
They are not there to be independent agents.”63 Empirical studies suggest
that campaign contributions,64 public opinion,65 proximity to elections,66
and other extralegal factors67 influence the decisions of dependent judges.68
None of this is conclusive, however. Even if dependence sometimes leads
judges to make decisions on the basis of extralegal factors, as some evidence

60. Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1229, 1232
(2008); see also Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 696–97 (1995) (“[T]o the extent majoritarian pressures influence
judicial decisions because of judges’ electoral calculations, elective judiciaries seem, at least at
first glance, irreconcilable with one of the fundamental principles underlying constitutionalism.” (emphasis omitted)); Geyh, supra note 15, at 51 (2003) (discussing the “judicial independence ‘problem’ caused by electing judges” and the concern that “a judge’s impartiality in
politically sensitive cases may be compromised”).
61. See Pozen, supra note 24, at 291 (“Countless critics have emphasized that elections
tend to make judges feel beholden to their supporters—be they major financial contributors,
ideological advocates, or political parties—and perhaps also ill-disposed toward those who
assisted the judges’ opponents . . . .”).
62.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872–76 (2009).

63. Davis Wants His Judges to Stay in Line, S.F. Chron., Mar. 1, 2000, at A3, available at
2000 WLNR 4939353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. E.g., Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 281 (2007) (finding evidence that elected judges favor
lawyers who contribute to their campaigns).
65. See Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Practice of Electing Judges, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 360 (2008) (finding that public support for
capital punishment influences judges’ decisions to uphold death sentences).
66. See Huber & Gordon, supra note 17.
67. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 Duke L.J.
1589 (2009) (finding evidence that appointed judges favor government litigants).
68. Of course, extralegal factors affect the decisions of independent judges too. For
discussion and abundant citations, see Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008).
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suggests, it might encourage greater fidelity to law overall.69 That could happen if the actors on whom judges depend generally pressure the judges to
act in accordance with law.70 Prominent scholars claim that this happens.71
Justice O’Connor, for example, argues that public accountability, if properly
structured, can and should “ensure[ ] that judges perform their constitutional role” of “applying the law fairly and impartially.”72
For this argument to have force, two assumptions must be satisfied at
least some of the time: the actors on whom judges depend must know what
the law requires, and they must recognize when judges have failed to follow
it.73 Since judges and lawyers often disagree about the meaning and requirements of law, some people doubt whether outside actors, in some cases lay
voters, will possess that information.74
Even this criticism is not decisive, however, because the inquiry is relative. The question is not whether dependent judges always apply the law
correctly and impartially; rather, the question is whether they do so more
often than independent judges.75 Notwithstanding the evidence and the informational problems addressed above, they just might.76 As countless critics
have argued, independent judges can exploit their insulation from politics
and the public, disregard law, and resolve cases on the basis of personal
preferences.77 Substantial evidence suggests that federal judges, the most independent jurists in the American system, do exactly that.78
69. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, The Controversy over Electing Judges and Advocacy in
Political Science, 30 Just. Sys. J. 284, 285 (2009) (“[P]ressures from electoral politics [can]
forc[e] judges to abandon their own political preferences and act in accordance with the rule
of law . . . .”); cf. O’Connor & Jones, supra note 37, at 15, 23 (promoting a “hybrid meritselection system” for judges and arguing that accountability can and should “ensure[ ] that
judges perform their constitutional role”).
70. Cf. Tom Parker, Elect Judges so They Can Be Held Accountable, Iowa Republican
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://theiowarepublican.com/2010/elect-judges-so-they-can-be-held-accountable (arguing that winning a judicial election freed the author “to be a fair and balanced
judge on the Alabama Supreme Court”).
71. See, e.g., Bonneau & Hall, supra note 38; Hall, supra note 69.
72. O’Connor & Jones, supra note 37, at 23.
73. Geyh, supra note 15, at 59 (questioning whether voters have the information necessary to “decide whether the rulings of judges coincide with the law”).
74. See id.
75. The language in the text simplifies the inquiry. The real inquiry is whether a relatively dependent judge would apply the law “correctly,” however correctly is defined, more
often than a more independent judge in the same setting hearing the same cases.
76. For evidence that state court judges objectively apply legal rules, at least some of the
time, see Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40 J. Legal Stud. 333 (2011).
77. See, e.g., Bonneau & Hall, supra note 38, at 14 (discussing how “several generations of scholars have established the primacy of . . . judges’ personal preferences on judicial
choice,” including choices by Supreme Court justices, and noting that “various works attribute
the ability of the justices to engage in such behavior to . . . lifetime tenure” and other independence-enhancing institutions).
78. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model Revisited 1 (2002); see also Posner, supra note 68, at 7 (discussing the
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2. Congruence with Society
Public accountability should make judges more congruent with mainstream values. As Melinda Gann Hall and Chris Bonneau write in a book
advocating judicial elections, “We think it far better for justices to draw
upon public perceptions and the prevailing . . . political climate when resolving difficult disputes than to engage in the unfettered pursuit of their own
personal preferences.”79 So goes a core argument in favor of making judges
dependent.80
Some evidence supports this line of reasoning. State court judges subject
to reappointment or reelection appear to respond to popular opinion some
of the time.81 To illustrate, one study found that public support for capital
punishment influences the willingness of state court judges to uphold death
sentences.82
But evidence cuts the other way too, suggesting that public accountability is neither necessary nor sufficient for making judges act consistently with
mainstream values. Evidence that U.S. Supreme Court justices, plausibly the
most independent judges in the land, respond to popular opinion83 suggests
that institutional accountability is not necessary.84 And evidence that dependent judges respond to narrow interests, including political cronies and campaign contributors, rather than the public at large suggests that

same literature). For a brief review of the judicial-politics literature, including efforts to test
whether law influences judges’ decisions, see Gilbert, supra note 76, at 336–38.
79. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 38, at 15.
80. See, e.g., id.; Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31 (1986).
81. For studies on politics, popular opinion, and state court decisions, see, for example,
Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in Running for Judge 165 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States, 23 Am. Pol. Q. 485 (1995); Melinda
Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform,
95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 315 (2001); and Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics
on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. Legal Stud. 169 (2009).
82. See Brace & Boyea, supra note 65.
83. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence (2011); Barry
Friedman, The Will of the People (2009); Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to
Civil Rights (2004); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court
(1989).
84. But again, the inquiry is relative. The question is not whether independent or dependent judges respond to popular opinion; the questions are which type of judge responds
more and under what conditions?
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accountability is not sufficient.85 To illustrate the latter point, one study suggests that elected judges favor lawyers who contribute to their campaigns.86
Of course, no one believes that public accountability, regardless of its
operating mechanism, will ensure fidelity to mainstream values; it has to be
properly structured. The literature on judicial selection focuses largely on
that issue.87
To be clear, the arguments in this Section differ from the ones in the last
Section. The claim here is not that dependence changes the frequency with
which judges follow the law (i.e., their propensity for legalism). Rather, the
claim is that when judges do not follow the law—either because they disregard it or because the law is indeterminate and they have to select from a
menu of options—dependence changes their decisions. It can change judges’
decisions for the better, as when accountability leads judges to respond to
the general public and make wise decisions that align closely with society’s
needs and preferences.88 Or it can change them for the worse, as when accountability leads judges to makes decisions to satisfy narrow interest
groups.
Existing analyses of judicial independence conflate these issues. They
treat the potential advantage of accountability (responsiveness to public sentiment) and the potential advantage of independence (impartiality and commitment to the law) like “different sides of the same coin,” twin virtues that
can be combined through different institutional arrangements to achieve an
ideal balance.89 But that is not quite right, or at least that is not the only way
to frame it. Those virtues can represent different coins: one signifying representativeness and the other commitment to legalism.90 Much of my analysis
grows from that distinction.
85. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 190, 215–16 (1993); Roy A.
Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of
American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & Pol. 57, 58–72 (1985); Shepherd, supra note 67; Shepherd,
supra note 42; Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections
and Judicial Review, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1061, 1133 (2010).
86. See Cann, supra note 64.
87. E.g., Pozen, supra note 24, at 270–75; Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 579, 600 (2004)
(“[S]kepticism about universal answers to questions of judicial selection is in order . . . .
[B]eing a democracy dictates less than might be expected about methodologies for judicial
selection.”). See generally Evan Haynes, The Selection and Tenure of Judges (1944).
88. I recognize that “society’s needs and preferences” is a loaded phrase given disagreements about what constitutes social welfare and the difficulties inherent in aggregating group
preferences. I use the phrase loosely.
89. See Burbank & Friedman, supra note 29, at 15.
90. For excellent, recent discussions of some of these themes, see Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215
(2012), and David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L.
Rev. 2047, 2076–86 (2010). Both articles, like much of the literature, blur the line between
representativeness and commitment to legalism.
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3. Minority Rights
Judges are often responsible for protecting minority rights. Dependent
judges subject to majoritarian pressures may neglect this responsibility. As
Steven Croley writes, “When those charged with checking the majority are
themselves answerable to . . . the majority, the question arises how . . .
minority protection is secured.”91 Independent judges, on the other hand,
do not answer to the majority and can protect minorities.92 So goes a core
argument in favor of judicial independence.93
While independence empowers judges to protect minorities, it does not
compel them to do so.94 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court long permitted segregation in public schools. After reversing course and requiring integration, the Court dragged its feet in fashioning a remedy, and it permitted
states to remain segregated for many years.95 Conversely, dependent judges
may ignore (or misperceive) the majority’s position and protect minorities.
In recent years, many state court judges have concluded that same-sex
couples have a right to marry.96 Consequently, the relationship between independence and minority rights is not clear.
4. Determinacy of Law
“The strong claim in favor of judicial independence rests on the case in
which there is a clear legal rule . . . .”97 This claim implicates legal
determinacy.
The law as applied to a given case may be determinate, by which I mean
that it provides a unique and discernable answer to the legal question
presented.98 Whether a person driving faster than the posted speed limit

91.

Croley, supra note 60, at 694.

92. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
Va. L. Rev. 1 (1996) (discussing and critiquing the common view that independent judicial
review protects minorities).
93. See Croley, supra note 60, at 694.
94. Cf. Klarman, supra note 92, at 6 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s capacity to protect
minority rights is more limited than most justices or scholars allow.”).
95. See Klarman, supra note 83, at 290–320.
96. E.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by state constitutional amendment, Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
97. Karlan, supra note 29, at 541. The complete quotation is, “The strong claim in favor
of judicial independence rests on the case in which there is a clear legal rule, but either the rule
or one of the litigants is unpopular.” Id. Karlan is not so much embracing this position as
describing the conventional view.
98. See Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 Legal Theory 481, 481–85 (1995).
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without justification violated the law is probably a determinate legal question.99 On the other hand, law may be indeterminate, meaning that it fails to
provide a unique and discernable answer. Whether the Constitution grants
same-sex couples a right to marry is probably an indeterminate legal
question.100
Determinacy is complicated.101 One can distinguish between indeterminacy, meaning that the law fails to narrow the universe of solutions to a legal
question, and underdeterminacy, meaning that the law narrows the universe
but leaves more than one possibility.102 One can distinguish between indeterminacy resulting from limitations in available facts and indeterminacy resulting from inadequacy of legal reasons.103 Legal reasons may be inadequate
because they are few in number, leaving gaps in the law, or because they are
many in number, leading to contradictions among them.104 This implicates
the debate over what constitutes a legal reason.105 Finally, there is a question
of audience. Is law determinate if it provides a unique and discernable answer only to Hercules?106 Or must it also provide an answer to ordinary
members of the interpretive community?107
Many scholars agree that law can be determinate, however defined, but
disagree on how often this happens.108 This relates to the debate over judicial
independence. Many argue that as law becomes more indeterminate—and
judging becomes “more art than science,” with judges routinely making policy and value judgments—the case for independence gets weaker.109
99. See Kenneth Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 283, 297 (1989) (using a
similar example to illustrate determinacy).
100. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
101. See generally Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549 (1993); Leiter, supra note 98.
102. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 473 (1987); Leiter, supra note 98, at 481 n.1.
103. Cf. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and
Legal Theory 261, 266 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (“Indeterminacy enters not just in the
interpretation of statutes and precedents, but also in the wide latitude judges have in how to
characterize the facts of a case.”).
104. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 101, at 566–68.
105. For opposing views, compare, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997), with Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005).
106. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 239 (1986) (introducing Hercules, a construct
of an ideal judge).
107. Cf. Grodin, supra note 38, at 1975 (“In the domain of moral judgments . . . I have
yet to find that degree of objectivity which, according to Dworkin, avoids the exercise of true
discretion. I am willing to accept that this may be because I am not Hercules, but I have yet to
encounter him either.”).
108. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978); Kress, supra
note 99; Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399 (1985); Joseph William Singer,
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1 (1984); Solum, supra note
102.
109. Kermit L. Hall, Constitutional Machinery and Judicial Professionalism: The Careers
of Midwestern State Appellate Court Judges, 1861–1899, in The New High Priests: Lawyers
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5. Value of Legalism
Freeing judges from external pressure empowers them to make decisions
in accordance with law—that is, “legalistic” decisions. The debate about independence presupposes that legalistic decisions are socially beneficial, always or at least on average. Decisions that do not accord with law are
“nonlegalistic” decisions. The debate presupposes that these decisions are
harmful.
People disagree on what counts as a “legal” reason110 and on the meaning of the “rule of law.”111 To illustrate, some argue that the intent of legislators who drafted a statute, if discernible,112 can provide a valid reason for
interpreting the statute a particular way.113 Others argue that legislative intent provides an invalid reason for an interpretation; only the text of the
statute can provide a valid (i.e., legal) reason.114 Likewise, some argue that
the “rule of law” does not impose constraints on the content of the law.115
On this account, “the rule of law is perfectly compatible with iniquity in the
content of laws.”116 Others argue that the rule of law requires obedience to
legal rules and also the protection and promotion of values like equality,
dignity, and justice.117 Because people disagree about these matters, they
necessarily disagree about what constitutes a legalistic or a nonlegalistic judicial decision. I will return to this dilemma later.
All judicial decisions—whether legalistic or nonlegalistic—affect social
welfare, which, again, is defined here as aggregate utility. Parties who win
their cases gain utility, and parties who lose suffer a utility loss. Decisions
upholding or invalidating legislation or otherwise bearing on public policy
affect the utility of persons who were not parties to the case.
in Post-Civil War America 29, 34–38, 42–43 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). For other discussions of this argument, see, for example, Dubois, supra note 80; Grodin, supra note 38;
Karlan, supra note 29; and Nelson, supra note 85.
110. Compare Breyer, supra note 105, at 85–101 (arguing that a statute’s purpose and
legislative intent should be emphasized when interpreting a statute), with Scalia, supra note
105, at 3–47 (arguing that statutory interpretation should not take into account legislative
intent).
111. For a compact discussion with a plethora of references, see M. Krygier, Rule of
Law, in 20 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 13,403
(Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001).
112. On the problems of discerning intent, see, for example, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239
(1992).
113. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 221–30 (2d. ed. 2006).
114. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev.
673 (1997). For a helpful overview and dissection of this debate, see Caleb Nelson, What Is
Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347 (2005).
115. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Morality of Law, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1965) (book
review).
116. Krygier, supra note 111, at 13,406.
117. See id. at 13,407.
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Legalistic decisions plausibly have additional effects on social welfare as
well.118 They support reliance interests and predictability in legal obligations.119 They constrain public and private actors, which helps to ensure security and individual freedoms.120 By implying that law is taken seriously,
they encourage obedience to law and legal, as opposed to extralegal, resolution of grievances. These effects reduce violence and facilitate social order.
All of this generates utility.121
Nonlegalistic decisions do not generate utility in these ways. On the
contrary, they can undermine reliance interests, predictability, and general
commitments to lawfulness, and that can decrease aggregate utility. But that
does not imply that society always opposes nonlegalistic decisions. Presidents from Jefferson to Lincoln and Roosevelt to Bush have made, or
threatened to make, nonlegalistic decisions in the service of some greater
good.122 In the right circumstance, such decisions can generate more net
utility than legalistic decisions. The same can be true of nonlegalistic decisions by other actors, including judges.
This discussion relates to judicial independence. Independence empowers judges to make legalistic decisions, but legalism is not an absolute good.
Therefore, the value of independence must turn in part on whether and to
what degree legalistic decisions generate more utility than nonlegalistic decisions. The scholarship on independence does not draw out this point, but it
is critical to the debate.
C. The Debate Stalled
The debate about judicial independence has progressed slowly, in part
because there is no single, unified debate. As the introduction to a recent
book on the subject puts it, “There is no literature on judicial independence;
rather, there are ‘literatures.’ ”123 Legal scholars, social scientists, and historians have all tackled the issue, directly or indirectly, by asking different questions and using different tools.124 They often fail to communicate with one
another.

118. See id. at 13,403–04; Tamanaha, supra note 54.
119. This assumes that people make plans and develop expectations based on law. This
is a standard assumption, but it may be wrong. In certain circumstances people may rely on,
and expect, nonlegalistic decisions.
120. Nonlegalistic decisions can constrain government actors too but presumably in
less predictable ways.
121. See generally Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (2000); Frederick
Schauer, Playing by the Rules (1991).
122. For an interesting discussion and several plausible examples, see Frederick
Schauer, Is Legality Political?, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481 (2011).
123. Stephen B. Burbank et al., Introduction, in Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, supra note 29, at 3, 3.
124. See id.
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Even among members of the first category, legal scholars, the debate is
fractured. Two of the factors mentioned above that bear on judicial independence—the determinacy of law and the concept of legalism—have generated
their own substantial and contested literatures.125 We simply do not agree on
what it means for law to be determinate or on how judges ought to resolve
cases. Yet resolution of these issues seems like a prerequisite. As Lewis Kornhauser writes, “[D]ifferent theories of adjudication will identify different
normative goals that one ought to promote through the design of a judicial
system.”126 Consequently, we need to agree on a theory of adjudication
before we can talk intelligently about the proper degree of judicial
independence.127
Moreover, legal scholars have folded the debate about independence
into other debates. “[I]t is fairly certain that no single subject has consumed
as many pages in law reviews . . . over the past fifty years as the subject of
judicial selection.”128 That debate is largely a proxy for the debate about independence.129 There is an “immense scholarly enterprise”130 devoted to the
countermajoritarian difficulty, which arises when independent judges review
acts passed by elected officials.131 Social scientists and, increasingly, law
professors study judicial decisionmaking.132 Much of that debate rests on
assumptions about independence: Just how free are judges to act without
regard to external forces?133 Through these and other134 lines of work, legal
scholars consider judicial independence indirectly.
In short, the debate about judicial independence has stalled. It has gotten bogged down by disagreements about the nature of law and judging.
And it has gotten captured by important but in some ways tangential debates on judicial selection and other topics.

125. See infra notes 181–195 and accompanying text.
126. Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 52.
127. See id. (“[B]ecause a conception of judicial independence is derivative of the normative theory of adjudication, the concept cannot guide a choice between competing
theories.”).
128. Dubois, supra note 80, at 31.
129. See, e.g., id. at 34–35 (relating selection to independence).
130. Burbank, supra note 29, at 326.
131. See generally Seidman, supra note 11, at 1574–79 (discussing the relationship between judicial independence and the countermajoritarian difficulty).
132. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 76.
133. Cf. Clark, supra note 83, at 1–22 (tying theories of judicial decisionmaking to
judges’ independence).
134. See, e.g., Bruhl & Leib, supra note 90; Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age
of International Legisprudence, 44 Hastings L.J. 185, 204–05 (1993) (tying theories of statutory interpretation to judicial independence).
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II. Optimal Judicial Independence
The last Part presented five factors that animate the debate about judicial independence: propensity for legalism, congruence with society, minority rights, determinacy of law, and value of legalism. The existing literature
usually conflates the first two, ignores the fifth, and largely treats the rest in
isolation from one another.135 This Part stitches the factors together. The
result is a single analytical framework for identifying the socially optimal
degree of judicial independence. This framework shows how the factors
identified above, by themselves and in combination with one another, affect
the optimal choice of judge.
This framework makes a number of contributions to the literature. I
will explain most of them in Part III, but one deserves mention now: it
allows us to transcend the thorny issues bogging down the debate. One can
input into the framework whatever beliefs or assumptions one wishes—
about relationships between independence, propensity for legalism, and social congruence, about the determinacy of law, and so forth—and the
framework will still yield answers and insights. This means that we need not
resolve the deep issues discussed in Part I to make progress. Irrespective of
one’s views of those matters, this analysis takes us forward.
Three clarifications merit attention at the outset. First, to make the analysis as general as possible, this framework addresses the independence of a
judge in the abstract. It can be applied to a trial or an appellate judge, to a
state or a national judge, or to a specialized judge or a judge with general
jurisdiction.
Second, this framework helps identify the optimal level of independence
for a judge resolving a single case. One can imagine selecting, on a case-bycase basis, the optimal judge for the dispute at hand. Arbitration, for example, sometimes has that character, and the framework could help identify the
optimal arbitrator.136 But usually judges are not selected on a case-by-case
basis. Rather, they are selected to resolve hundreds, thousands, or possibly
tens of thousands of cases, and they are selected before the details of those
cases are known. The framework can accommodate such judges. The trick is
to conceive of the single case in the framework as a representative case.137 By
identifying the optimal degree of independence for the representative case,
one identifies the optimal degree for the whole batch of cases.
Finally, the third point is methodological. I will describe the framework
with words and with a decision tree and some simple math. The tree and the
math lend precision to the analysis, but one need not follow them to understand the ideas.
135. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 24, at 270–96 (organizing and presenting standard arguments for and against elections, which are good proxies for arguments for and against
independence).
136. Cf. Posner & Yoo, supra note 19, at 29–34 (providing a concise summary of
arbitration).
137. Representative in terms of welfare implications, which in this Article means implications for aggregate utility.
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Because of the decision tree and the math, one might suppose that this
is a game-theoretic model. It is not. Such models are characterized by strategic interactions between two or more players, each of whom seeks to maximize his utility.138 There are two players in my story: a benevolent dictator,
who seeks the socially optimal degree of independence, and a judge. The
dictator has a utility function, which is really a social welfare function: what
is best for the dictator is best for society. But I am not committing to a
utility function for the judge.139 The reason is simple: there are many plausible utility functions for a judge, with the level of independence the judge
enjoys playing a different role in each one. To select a particular function
would limit the generality of this Article. My objective is not to derive an
equilibrium and generate testable hypotheses but to provide a locus for debate, including debate about judges’ utility functions and the role of independence in them.140
A. Step One: The Judge
The framework begins with a choice. A benevolent dictator—that is, a
dictator who seeks to maximize social welfare, defined here as aggregate utility—chooses between an independent and a dependent judge. As those labels suggest, the choice is binary. The dictator can select from two and only
two points on the judicial independence continuum, with the one closer to
the independence end of the spectrum constituting the independent judge.
I make the choice binary to simplify the analysis. In the Appendix, I
relax this restriction and make the variable continuous, allowing the dictator
to select any particular degree of independence. I show that this does not
affect my analysis.
The dictator—and therefore society—cannot change judges. Once the
judge is selected, there is no going back. That judge will resolve the case.

138. See generally Nolan McCarty & Adam Meirowitz, Political Game Theory
(2007).
139. At least not to a complete one. Below, I assume that judges derive utility from two
activities: adjudicating and legislating. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
140. Here is a fuller and slightly more technical explanation of my methodological
choice. To construct a utility function for judges, I need to make assumptions not only about
the sources of judges’ utility—I have settled on adjudicating and legislating—but also about
the relationship between independence and those sources. Specifically, I need to assume that
greater independence either increases or decreases the weight judges place on adjudicating and
legislating, respectively. As soon as I make such an assumption, the model itself, or at least the
version I have constructed, becomes superfluous. It adds complexity to this Article but no
additional insights. My contribution, and the action in this Article, lies in thinking through
possible relationships between independence and sources of judicial utility, not in committing
to any particular one.
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B. Step Two: The Case
Next, the judge is presented with a case. Suppose the case turns on a
single legal question.141 The law with respect to that question might be determinate, meaning that it provides a unique and discernable answer. Or it
might be indeterminate, meaning that it fails to provide such an answer.
I conceptualize these ideas in terms of probabilities. There is some
probability, d, that the law is determinate, and a (1 – d) probability that the
law is indeterminate. Adding d and (1 – d) yields 1, meaning that there is a
100 percent chance that the law is either determinate or indeterminate.
There are no other possibilities.142
Note that d and (1 – d) are placeholders. They can accommodate different conceptions of and assumptions about the determinacy of law. This is
important because it permits the analysis to proceed without implicating
philosophical disagreements. Readers can substitute whatever probabilities
they like based on their assumptions about the set of cases from which the
representative case is drawn. There could be a zero percent chance, a 100
percent chance, or any figure in between that the law is determinate in the
case. The framework still operates.
Note also that I treat the determinacy of law as an exogenous factor. The
benevolent dictator can select the degree of judicial independence, but he
cannot select the determinacy of law.143 I maintain that assumption to simplify the analysis and to shed light on practical policy choices. Politicians
and voters often consider changing the degree of judicial independence by
changing judges’ compensation, selection methods, and so forth. They typically consider such changes without simultaneously changing the body of
law those judges interpret.144
C. Step Three: The Decision
Now the judge must decide how to resolve the case. Depending on the
circumstances, the judge can make a legalistic or a nonlegalistic decision. As
discussed, people disagree on what distinguishes those decisions from each
other,145 but that need not paralyze the analysis. I can simply posit that both
types of decisions exist, and readers can define them however they like. As
long as neither category is empty—as long as readers agree that there is such
a thing as a legalistic decision and such a thing as a nonlegalistic decision,
however subjectively defined—then the framework operates just fine.
141.

It could be a pure legal question or a mixed question of law and fact.

142. Treating the determinacy of law as binary—the law provides a unique answer to
the legal question or no answer at all—simplifies the analysis at the cost of realism. Future
work could take a more nuanced approach by allowing for a continuum of determinacy.
143.

In future work, I hope to relax this assumption.

144. See, e.g., Bonneau & Hall, supra note 38 (advocating for judicial elections without mention of changing or clarifying legal doctrines); Parker, supra note 70 (same).
145. See supra Section I.B.5.
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Let me dwell on this for a moment. I am deliberately refusing to take a
position on what distinguishes a legalistic decision from a nonlegalistic decision. I am not doing so because I think that the distinction is unimportant
or because I have no views on the matter. Rather, I am doing so to maximize
the generality of the Article. Under my approach, one can use the framework
to analyze judicial independence irrespective of one’s understanding of legalism. That is the same move I made regarding the determinacy of law. Readers can “read in” whatever conceptions of determinacy and legalism they
like. The framework still works.
Suppose the law as applied to the case is determinate. In that event, the
judge can make a legalistic decision. Alternatively, he can depart from the
determinate law and make a nonlegalistic decision.
How does a judge choose between making a legalistic and a nonlegalistic
decision? I assume that the judge derives utility in two ways: applying laws to
cases (adjudicating) and pursuing personal or policy goals (legislating).146
How the judge resolves the case will depend on the weight he places on
those factors, the intensity of his preferences for the issue in the case, and
the correspondence between his preferences and the law. If he places little
weight on adjudicating and a lot of weight on legislating, then he will only
make a legalistic decision if that decision happens to correspond with his
preferences for the issue.147 Otherwise, he will make a nonlegalistic decision.
If he places a lot of weight on adjudicating, then he will make a legalistic
decision—unless he has very intense preferences for the issue and strongly
disagrees with the law, in which case he will make a nonlegalistic decision.148
Whether the judge is independent or dependent can affect this calculation. One can imagine a variety of possibilities here. Independence could
increase the weight the judge places on adjudicating if it frees him from
external pressure and allows him to do what he likes best, which is to interpret law objectively. There is an alternative mechanism that would have the
same effect: an independent judgeship might attract candidates who place
146. These are standard inputs in the judicial utility functions constructed by scholars.
Cf. Lawrence Baum, Law and Policy: More and Less Than a Dichotomy, in What’s Law Got to
Do with It? 71, 71 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (“[T]he most frequent question about
judicial behavior is the balance between law and policy.”). But see Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1
(1993) (positing a more complicated function).
147. Cf. Klarman, supra note 83, at 5 (“When the law is clear, judges will generally
follow it, unless they have very strong personal preferences to the contrary.”).
148. I assume that judges never make mistakes, so every nonlegalistic decision in a
determinate case is intentional. Alternatively, I could assume that independent and dependent
judges are equally likely to make mistakes. Either way, the analysis would be the same. Some
might claim that independent judgeships attract higher-quality judges, and one might suppose
that means that independent judges make fewer mistakes. I do not consider that possibility. I
note that such a claim is hard to evaluate, in part because sensible empirical measures of
quality are hard to come by. Cf. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. Econ. & Org. 290
(2010) (attempting to develop metrics for judicial quality).
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more weight on adjudicating than a dependent judgeship.149 Alternatively,
independence could drive a wedge between the judge’s preferences and the
law. Freed from public accountability, an independent judge might develop
or pursue idiosyncratic goals in a way that a dependent judge would not.
I want to analyze all of these possibilities without committing to any of
them. I can do so cleanly with some notation. If the judge is independent,
there is a probability, p, that he will make a legalistic decision. This represents the propensity for legalism discussed in Part I. There is a (1 – p)
probability that he will have sufficiently intense preferences for the issue in
the case and that he will disagree with the law. In that event, he will make a
nonlegalistic decision.
If the judge is dependent, there is a (p + i) probability that he will make
a legalistic decision and a (1 – p – i) probability that he will make a nonlegalistic decision. The variable i reflects the change in the likelihood that the
judge will behave legalistically because he is dependent and publicly accountable. The variable i is positive if dependence increases the likelihood of
a legalistic decision and negative if it decreases the likelihood of a legalistic
decision.
Note that minority rights enter the framework here. If dependence
makes a judge prone to make nonlegalistic decisions that undermine minority rights, then the value of i decreases.
So far I have assumed that the law as applied to the case is determinate.
Now suppose the law is indeterminate; it fails to provide an answer. By definition, the judge must draw on a source other than law to resolve the case.
Consequently, I refer to all judicial decisions in indeterminate cases as
nonlegalistic decisions. That obviates the need for notation and probabilities. If the law is indeterminate, the decision necessarily will be nonlegalistic.
This approach equates decisions in cases where the law is indeterminate
with decisions in cases where the law is determinate but the judge intentionally deviates from the law: all are nonlegalistic. That may seem objectionable. The former kind of decision seems less troubling than the latter.
Intentional deviations from law may cause greater harm than gap-filling in
indeterminate cases. While this difference may matter for other inquiries, it
does not affect the present analysis. I prove this in the Appendix and provide
an intuitive explanation below.150 Consequently, I ignore this complication.
To summarize, the judge must make a decision. If the law is determinate, the judge chooses between a legalistic and a nonlegalistic decision. If
the law is indeterminate, the judge makes a nonlegalistic decision.
Two final points deserve attention. First, a judge can make a nonlegalistic decision, and write an opinion explaining that decision, without appearing nonlegalistic. He can use legal language and cite precedents and

149. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 8, at 397 (James Madison) (arguing for life
tenure on the ground that “a temporary duration in office” would “discourage” competent
jurists “from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench”).
150. See infra note 159; infra Appendix.
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statutory and constitutional text.151 The judge might even believe that the
decision is legalistic, even as others with shared judicial philosophies conclude otherwise.152 The point is that nonlegalistic decisions need not be obvious. They can resemble legalistic decisions, and be defended as such, even
as they are attacked, rightly, for being nonlegalistic. This accords with casual
observations of the judicial process.153
Second, many cases result in a singular decision by the judge: the plaintiff wins or loses. That decision involves the outcome of the case. Other cases,
typically at the appellate level, may result in two decisions, one involving the
outcome and the other involving the rule. One can use the framework to
think about the relationship between judicial independence and either kind
of decision. Consequently, I do not distinguish between an “outcome decision” and a “rule decision.” I refer only to decisions. Again, in the spirit of
generality, the reader can work through the framework with either type of
decision in mind.
D. Step Four: The Payoff
The judge’s decision, whether legalistic or nonlegalistic, affects social
welfare, meaning that it affects aggregate utility. I refer to this effect as the
“social payoff” of the decision. This Section describes possible payoffs.
To begin, suppose the law is indeterminate. Here, the judge is like a
policymaker; he chooses from a menu of options. His decision, which is
necessarily nonlegalistic, yields a social payoff that reflects the sum of utility
gained by the winning party, the utility lost by the losing party, and all the
utility gains and losses experienced by individuals affected by, but not directly involved in, the litigation. A “good” or “wise” decision might generate
a lot of utility, while a “bad” or “foolish” decision might generate very little.
I can make these ideas concrete with a concept from political science.
The median voter theorem posits that, under certain conditions, the policy
that the median voter prefers will defeat all alternative policies in a head-tohead vote.154 If additional conditions are satisfied, then the policy that the
median voter prefers also represents the policy that maximizes aggregate
151. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 103, at 270 (describing how a judge confessed to deciding cases based on “where justice lay,” and then “almost always found principles suited to [his]
view of the case” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jerome
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 104 n. (1930))).
152. See Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the
“Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 Law & Soc. Inquiry 465, 490 (2001) (reviewing
Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will (1999)). Under a
“post-positivist” account, holding this belief might make the decision legalistic. Id. at 486.
153. Consider, for example, the opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per
curiam). It looks like other opinions, but by many (but of course not all) accounts, it is nonlegalistic, at least with respect to the remedy. For a critical discussion, see Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice (2001).
154. See Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958);
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957).
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utility.155 The conditions are somewhat technical, and I will not examine
them in the text.156 Instead, I will illustrate with an example.
Suppose three voters are choosing from three tax rates: 5%, 10%, and
15%. The “conservative” voter prefers 5%, and his utility declines as taxes go
up from there. The “liberal” voter prefers 15%, and his utility declines as
taxes go down from there. The “moderate” voter prefers 10%, and his utility
declines as taxes go up or down from there. The moderate is the median. His
preferred tax rate, 10%, would defeat each alternative rate two to one in a
head-to-head vote. (The conservative and the moderate prefer 10% to 15%,
and the moderate and the liberal prefer 10% to 5%.) If the utility the conservative gains when the rate approaches 5% exactly offsets the utility the
liberal loses and vice versa, then the moderate’s preferred rate maximizes the
group’s utility. If the rate increases beyond 10%, the gains and losses of the
conservative and the liberal would wash out, but the moderate would lose
utility, leading to a net loss. Likewise if the rate dropped below 10%.
I assume that the conditions are satisfied such that the median citizen’s
preferred policy is also the policy that maximizes aggregate utility. This assumption simplifies and lends precision to the analysis. Now the social payoff of the judge’s decision depends entirely on the congruence between the
judge and the median citizen.157 The closer the judge’s decision is to the
median citizen’s preferred decision, the greater the social payoff of the
judge’s decision, and vice versa.
This assumption might seem implausible for any particular case, but it
seems more plausible for a representative case, which, as discussed, is the
focus of the framework. For every case on the docket in which a decision
“left” of the median would maximize utility, there is an offsetting case in
which a decision “right” of the median would maximize utility. In any event,
the assumption is not critical to the analysis. If it does not hold, the question
simply changes from “which judge is more congruent with the median citizen?” to “which judge is more congruent with the citizen whose ideal outcome would maximize aggregate utility?”158
155. Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 33–35 (2000).
156. Here are the conditions: there is a unique median citizen, issues are separable, and
with respect to each issue, citizens are distributed symmetrically around the median and have
single-peaked preferences that are symmetrically intense. See id.
157. Note that I have switched from the median voter to the median citizen. The citizen, and not the voter, is the relevant benchmark given my conception of social welfare.
158. This point may merit some elaboration. I assume that the social payoff of a judge’s
decision in a case where the law is indeterminate depends entirely on the proximity of that
decision to the decision the median citizen would prefer. I have adopted this assumption to
make the analysis simpler and more precise. Nothing substantive turns on it, however. One
could leave the discussion general, assuming only that “good” decisions (however defined)
increase social welfare and “bad” decisions reduce it. Alternatively, one could adopt a precise
but different (and dubious) approach, assuming, for example, that decisions closer to the
preference of an extreme liberal or an extreme conservative increase social welfare and decisions further away reduce it. All one needs to run the analysis is some benchmark for evaluating the social payoff of decisions in cases where judges exercise policymaking discretion. I have
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The variable c represents the social payoff of the decision by an independent judge in a case where the law is indeterminate. It reflects the congruence between the judge and the median citizen. The expression (c + a)
represents the payoff of the decision by a dependent judge in this circumstance. The variable a reflects the change in congruence that results from
making the judge dependent on an outside authority. The variable a is positive if dependence makes the judge more congruent with the median citizen
and negative if dependence makes him less congruent with the median
citizen.
Now suppose the law is determinate, and suppose the judge makes a
nonlegalistic decision. As above, that decision yields a payoff reflecting the
sum of utility gained by the winner, lost by the loser, and gained or lost by
third parties. That sum depends on the congruence between the judge and
the median citizen. The intuition runs like this: the judge is not making a
legalistic decision but rather a policy choice. Greater congruence between
that choice and the median citizen’s preferred choice implies a higher payoff,
and vice versa.
One might suppose the payoff also depends on another factor, the
nonlegalism itself. This is, after all, a decision that contradicts determinate
law. Such a decision might reduce social welfare by undermining reliance
interests and predictability in legal obligations, for example. I ignore that
complication. As discussed in the last Section, I treat decisions in cases
where the law is indeterminate the same as decisions in cases where the law
is determinate but the judge does not follow it: all are nonlegalistic decisions. I do so not because such decisions are fundamentally the same but
because accounting for the difference would complicate the analysis without
changing the insights I am interested in. Again, I prove this assertion in the
Appendix.159
Consistent with that approach, the payoff of all nonlegalistic decisions is
a function of congruence with the median citizen and congruence alone.
The payoff of a nonlegalistic decision by an independent judge is always c,
and the payoff of such a decision by a dependent judge is always (c + a).
Finally, suppose the law is determinate, and suppose the judge makes a
legalistic decision. The resulting social payoff depends on two factors. First,
it depends on the value of legalism itself. A legalistic decision might, through
the promotion of reliance interests and predictability, generate a lot of utility. Second, it depends on the congruence between the decision and the raw
chosen proximity to the median citizen, but others could choose different benchmarks and still
use the framework.
159. Here is an intuitive explanation: I assume that the value of legalism does not depend on whether a judge is independent or dependent. See infra note 160. Consequently, the
cost of nonlegalism (undermining reliance interests and predictability, among other things)
does not depend on the judge either. If we want judges to make legalistic decisions in determinate cases, and if the cost of doing otherwise is the same regardless of the judge, then all that
matters for purposes of choosing between judges is the frequency with which they make legalistic and nonlegalistic decisions—that is, their propensities for legalism.
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policy preferences of the median citizen. By “raw preferences,” I mean preferences of the median citizen in the absence of any legal rules. In other
words, if the median citizen were fully informed and writing on a blank
slate, with no reliance interests or other legal values involved, what policy
would he select? The closer the legalistic decision is to that policy, the greater
the utility that flows from the decision, and vice versa.
I capture all of these ideas with simple notation. A legalistic decision
yields a social payoff labeled l.160
To be clear, there are two sources of utility in l: adherence to legalism
and the result that legalism produces. Because of the former, a legalistic
decision that does not align with the median citizen’s raw preference may
generate more utility than a nonlegalistic decision that does. Society may be
better off with an “off-median” decision that furthers legalism. Because of
the latter, a legalistic decision that does not align with the median citizen’s
raw preference may generate less utility than a nonlegalistic decision that
does. Society may be better off with an “on-median” decision that undermines legalism.
This leads to some important clarifications. If a judge makes a nonlegalistic decision, then the welfare-maximizing decision is always the decision
that aligns with the median citizen’s raw preferences. If a judge makes a
legalistic decision, that decision may or may not generate more utility than a
nonlegalistic alternative that is more congruent with the median citizen’s
raw preferences.
All of this can be summarized in short order. If the judge, whether independent or dependent, makes a legalistic decision, the social payoff is l. If the
judge is independent and makes a nonlegalistic decision, the social payoff is
c. If the judge is dependent and makes a nonlegalistic decision, the social
payoff is (c + a).
One final note. I express the social payoff of the judge’s decision in
terms of aggregate utility. I do so because I assume that aggregate utility is
an appropriate proxy for social welfare. Of course, that is contestable; utilitarianism has critics,161 and there are many alternative conceptions of social
welfare.162 To be clear, the framework is not limited to utilitarianism. It
could accommodate a variety of conceptions of social welfare. One would
have to reformulate values for legalistic decisions (l) and nonlegalistic decisions (c and (c + a)) in light of the new conception of social welfare. It
would not be a straightforward aggregation of individual utilities, but the
framework itself would not change.

160. I assume that the value of a legalistic decision is fixed, but in reality, it may vary by
judge. To illustrate, if citizens expect a dependent judge to fold under political pressure and
make nonlegalistic decisions, they may not rely on the law to guide their behavior. That would
make the payoff of a legalistic decision by a dependent judge lower than the payoff of an
equivalent decision by an independent judge.
161. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999).
162. See, e.g., id.
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E. Decision Tree
Figure 1 captures the entire framework in a decision tree. Readers who
do not care for the display and the math can safely skip this short Section.
Following the tree provides an easy summary. Society selects an independent or a dependent judge. The judge is then presented with a case.
There is a d probability that the law as applied to the case is determinate, in
which case the judge must choose between making a legalistic and a nonlegalistic decision. The probability that an independent judge makes a legalistic decision is p, and the probability of that judge making a nonlegalistic
decision is (1 – p). The probability that a dependent judge makes a legalistic
decision is (p + i), and the probability of him making a nonlegalistic decision is (1 – p – i). The payoff of a legalistic decision is always l. The payoff of
a nonlegalistic decision is c if the judge is independent and (c + a) if the
judge is dependent. There is a (1 – d) probability that the law is indeterminate, in which case both the independent and the dependent judge make a
nonlegalistic decision with payoffs of c and (c + a), respectively.
FIGURE 1.
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Table 1 provides definitions of the variables.
TABLE 1.
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable
d

Definition
Probability law as applied to case is determinate.

l

Social payoff of legalistic decision.

c

Congruence between independent judge and median citizen. c is the payoff
of nonlegalistic decision by independent judge.

a

Difference in congruence between independent and dependent judge. c + a
is the payoff of nonlegalistic decision by dependent judge.

p

Probability independent judge makes legalistic decision.

i

Difference in probability of legalistic decision between independent and
dependent judge. p + i is the probability a dependent judge makes a
legalistic decision.

In addition to providing a visual summary, the decision tree facilitates
the translation of concepts into math. For the mathematically inclined, the
social payoff of having an independent judge decide the case is
d(pl + (1 – p)c) + (1 – d)c.
The social payoff of having a dependent judge decide the case is
d((p + i)l + (1 – p – i)(c + a)) + (1 – d)(c + a).
Society is indifferent between the judges when the expected payoff of
each is the same, or, after some simplification, when
–a(1 – dp) = di(l – c – a).
All of the analysis in the next Part follows from this equation.
III. Independence Revisited
The framework in Part II distills a large and complex literature into a
small set of parameters and shows how they interact. If we had specific values for the parameters—law is determinate in 60 percent of cases, there is a
75 percent chance that an independent judge will make a legalistic decision,
and so on—then we could identify the optimal type of judge under those
conditions. Of course, we do not have such information, in part because of
limitations in available facts (e.g., we do not know judges’ propensities for
legalism) and in part because of philosophical disagreements (e.g., we do not
have a uniform definition of determinacy). But even so, the framework has
value. It lends structure to the normative and policy debates about independence. It ties empirical findings and arguments about one aspect of independence to the overarching question of institutional design. It also generates
new ideas about independence and reconceptualizes some old ones, as this
Part will show.
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One clarification is in order. As in Part II, this discussion treats the
choice of judge as binary: society can have an independent or a dependent
judge. This is unrealistic. Society can, by adjusting a variety of policy and
institutional levers, vest judges with varying degrees of independence.163 But
the binary approach simplifies the presentation of ideas without losing generality.164 Arguments in favor of an independent judge are really arguments
in favor of more judicial independence. Arguments in favor of a dependent
judge are arguments in favor of less independence.
A. Independence and Social Welfare
The choice between an independent and a dependent judge turns on
two characteristics: the propensity for legalism and the congruence with the
median citizen. If those characteristics are the same for both types of judges
(in the framework, if a = 0 and i = 0), then the judges are indistinguishable,
and society is indifferent between them. That is true regardless of the determinacy of the law, d, and the value of legalistic decisions, l.
This point is important by itself. The framework reduces the swirling
debate about independence to two dimensions. A wide variety of arguments
about independence can be characterized in those terms.
What if independent and dependent judges do not have the same propensity for legalism and congruence with the median citizen? Several possibilities arise. To begin, I assume that the social payoff of a legalistic
decision always exceeds the payoff of a nonlegalistic decision.165 That is, legalistic decisions generate more utility than nonlegalistic alternatives.
Suppose that making a judge dependent makes the judge more congruent with the median citizen.166 Then the payoff of a nonlegalistic decision by
a dependent judge rises. The implication is intuitive: if making judges dependent makes them more congruent with the median citizen, then dependent judges become more desirable.
Even in that circumstance, society may prefer an independent judge. In
addition to increasing congruence with the median citizen, suppose dependence decreases a judge’s propensity for legalism. This could occur if dependence subjects judges to pressure from outside individuals or interest
groups.167 Now a trade-off arises. An independent judge will make more
legalistic decisions, and fewer nonlegalistic decisions, than a dependent
judge. But each nonlegalistic decision will yield a low social payoff because
independent judges are less congruent with the median citizen. A dependent
judge will make fewer legalistic, and more nonlegalistic, decisions than an
163. See supra notes 33–47 and accompanying text.
164. The Appendix, infra, shows this mathematically.
165. In notation, l > c, and l > c + a.
166. Note that a dependent judge may on average be more congruent with the median
citizen even if he sometimes acts in the interests of narrow groups.
167. These individuals or groups would have to oppose existing law, in general or in a
particular case. If they supported existing law, they would encourage and try to increase a
judge’s propensity for legalism.
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independent judge. But each nonlegalistic decision will yield a relatively high
social payoff because dependent judges are more congruent with the median
citizen.
I can state the idea more simply. Independent judges will make fewer
nonlegalistic decisions than dependent judges, and that is good. But the
nonlegalistic decisions they make will be worse than dependent judges’
nonlegalistic decisions, and that is bad.
I illustrate with an example. This example and others in this Article are
politically salient and not meant to represent a typical case. I use them because they clarify ideas.
Suppose a case arises in which the legal question is “how must judges
review laws discriminating against homosexuals?” There are three possible
answers. Judges could give such laws strict scrutiny (harsh, few such laws
upheld), intermediate scrutiny (moderate, some such laws upheld), or rational basis review (lenient, most such laws upheld). Suppose for purposes
of this example that the correct legal answer is strict scrutiny and that most
people know that to be so. Suppose the median citizen’s first choice as a
policy matter—his raw preference168—would be intermediate scrutiny, and
his last choice would be rational basis review. And suppose the judge, although he does not feel strongly about the issue, would prefer rational basis
review.
If we select an independent judge to resolve the case, he is more likely to
reach the legally correct conclusion—strict scrutiny. That is socially beneficial. The public knows the right answer is strict scrutiny, and some people
(legislators, litigants, employers) have relied on that fact in carrying out their
activities. But if the independent judge makes a nonlegalistic decision, he
will likely select his personally preferred outcome, rational basis review. That
represents the public’s least-favored outcome.
If we select a dependent judge to resolve the case, he will come with the
opposite virtues and vices. Because of external pressure, he is less likely to
select the legally correct answer—strict scrutiny—and that is harmful. But if
he makes a nonlegalistic decision, he will likely select intermediate scrutiny,
and that is the median citizen’s preferred outcome.
So far I have assumed that there is a trade-off. I have assumed that the
same accountability that increases the congruence of a dependent judge will
also decrease his propensity for legalism. Intuition suggests that that tradeoff will often arise, but intuition can be wrong. In a particular setting, dependence could increase congruence and propensity for legalism. Or it could
decrease both. In such circumstances, the trade-off does not arise, and society strictly prefers an independent or dependent judge, respectively. Returning to the example, if a dependent judge would be more likely to choose
the correct legal answer—strict scrutiny—and, in the event that he made a
nonlegalistic decision, more likely to select the median citizen’s preferred
policy—intermediate scrutiny—then the dependent judge would clearly be
preferable to the independent judge.
168. See supra Section II.D.
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This leads to two observations. First, the debate about independence is
often incomplete. Proponents of an independent judiciary often argue that
independent judges make more legalistic decisions.169 But even if that were
true, that would be insufficient to make independent judges preferable. Independent judges must also be at least as congruent with society as dependent judges. Both conditions must be satisfied for society strictly to prefer an
independent judge. Conversely, proponents of a dependent, publicly accountable judiciary often argue that dependence makes judges more congruent with mainstream values.170 But even if that were true, that, again, would
be insufficient. Dependent judges must also be no more likely than independent judges to make nonlegalistic decisions. Both conditions must be satisfied for society strictly to prefer a dependent judge.
Once expressed, these ideas may sound obvious, but they are routinely
overlooked. I illustrate with a few examples. In an article opposing the practice of electing judges, Charles Geyh argues that, as long as our system of
government “depends on its courts to ensure that the executive and legislative branches and the temporary majorities they represent conform their
conduct to the dictates of the Constitution, methods of judicial selection
that make judges no less subject to the influence of temporary majorities are
anathema.”171 Joanna Shepherd provides evidence that elected judges make
decisions to attract votes and campaign contributions. She concludes, “Until
reforms are enacted, the application of impartial justice is at risk.”172 A recent editorial expresses opposition to judicial elections, arguing that if judges
“start looking over their shoulders every time they vote in a controversial
case . . . [t]hat will undermine impartial justice.”173 Thirty years ago, Irving
Kaufman, then the chief judge of the Second Circuit, expressed opposition
to legislation that could weaken judicial independence. He wrote, “[W]e
must resist even well-intentioned legislation that would chill the capacity of
the judge to render impartial justice.”174
I understand these statements to mean that greater independence is desirable because it leads to more legalistic decisionmaking. Many legal scholars, journalists, judges, and others hold this view, and it may be correct. But
critically, it does not mean that more independence is good for society. We
cannot conclude that greater independence will improve social welfare without addressing its effect on judges’ congruence with the median citizen.175
169. Cf. Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 191, 238–44 (2012) (discussing the relationship between independence, impartiality, and due process).
170. See Bonneau & Hall, supra note 38.
171. Geyh, supra note 15, at 72.
172. Shepherd, supra note 42, at 684.
173. Editorial, In Too Many States, Judges Face Reprisals for Unpopular Rulings, USA
Today, Oct. 19, 2010, at A8, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-10-19-editorial19_ST_N.htm.
174. Kaufman, supra note 53, at 700–01.
175. To be clear, we cannot draw that conclusion if we approach the question of optimal independence from a utilitarian or other consequentialist point of view, as I do. The

610

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:575

Some observers take the opposite view. In an article defending judicial
elections, Melinda Gann Hall writes, “ ‘Accountable’ judges would vote strategically by following constituency preferences, while independent judges
would vote their own preferences.”176 She is probably right. And if constituency preferences track the median citizen’s, then dependence yields benefits.
But that does not imply that greater dependence improves social welfare
overall. One cannot draw that conclusion without addressing the effect of
dependence on the propensity for legalism.
This discussion leads to one more conclusion: neither independence nor
dependence maximizes social welfare systematically. Simply put, there is no
globally optimal level of independence.177 The optimal type of judge depends
on relationships between independence, propensity for legalism, and congruence with the median citizen. These relationships surely vary across time
and place.
B. Minority Rights Are Not Dispositive
Conventional wisdom holds that independence makes judges more
likely to protect minority rights.178 That may not be true; an independent
judge may exploit his position and undercut minority rights. But even if it is
true, society still may prefer a dependent judge, at least under a utilitarian
conception of social welfare.
Suppose the law protects minorities, however defined. Suppose the social payoff of a legalistic decision exceeds the value of any nonlegalistic decision. This implies that protecting minority rights generates more utility than
failing to protect minority rights. Finally, suppose that dependent judges are,
in fact, less likely to protect minority rights.
Even in that circumstance, society may prefer a dependent judge. The
question is whether and to what degree dependent judges are more congruent with the median citizen. If they are more congruent, and by a large
enough margin, then a dependent judge is optimal.
I can make the point clearer yet. The benefit of protecting minority
rights with an independent judge may not compensate for the cost of nonlegalistic decisions in other cases by that judge if he is out of the mainstream.
This conclusion may be more striking than it first appears. Even if we
observe a dependent judge making decisions that harm minorities, even if
authors I quote, and many others, may (perhaps implicitly) approach the question from a
deontological standpoint, favoring greater independence because they believe that it will improve impartiality, which justice and morality require. In that case, my work is not a criticism
of their analyses but rather a consequentialist counterpart.
176.

Hall, supra note 69, at 286.

177. I am not the first to make this point. See, e.g., Burbank & Friedman, supra note 29,
at 35 (“[T]here is no single correct answer . . . to the problem of judicial independence (and
accountability).”). I have, however, shown precisely why this is so.
178. See Klarman, supra note 92, at 1–5 (documenting the many scholars who have
espoused this view).
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such decisions contradict determinate law, and even if we know that an independent judge would have protected those minorities, we cannot conclude
that an independent judge would be better for society. We need to compare
the social payoffs of nonlegalistic decisions by independent and dependent
judges in other cases not involving minority rights.
To illustrate these ideas, imagine two cases. In the first case, the legal
question once again is “how must judges review laws discriminating against
homosexuals?” Suppose that in this case, the state constitution requires such
laws to be given strict scrutiny. In the second case, the legal question is “can
citizens recall a governor on the basis of policy disagreement alone, or must
they show cause (corruption, malfeasance, and so on)?” Suppose that the
law is indeterminate on that point but citizens overwhelmingly prefer the
first interpretation—policy disagreement alone. Finally, suppose an independent judge would be more likely to make the legalistic decision (strict
scrutiny) in the first case. If a dependent judge would be more likely to
choose citizens’ preferred interpretation in the second case, then a dependent judge may, all things considered, maximize social welfare. This is true
even though such a judge would be less likely to make the legally correct,
minority-protective decision in the first case.
This leads to several observations. First, the choice between an independent and a dependent judge turns in part on the prevalence, not just the
existence, of minority-rights cases. If minority-rights cases are common, and
if dependent judges regularly make nonlegalistic decisions that do not protect minorities, then dependent judges must be much more congruent with
the median citizen to be preferable. Conversely, if minority-rights cases are
rare, society may prefer a dependent judge even if he is not much more
congruent than an independent judge.
This leads to a second observation. As changes in law or enforcement
alter the fraction of minority-rights cases on courts’ dockets, the optimal
type of judge may change.
Third, the relationship between independence and minority rights is
commonly misunderstood. Some treat the claim that independent judges are
desirable because they are more likely to safeguard minority rights as a
standalone rationale—sometimes the main rationale—for an independent
judiciary. As Theodore Olson stated after a federal judge struck down California’s ban on same-sex marriage, “That’s why we have judges and that’s
why we have an independent judiciary.”179 But that is not quite right. If the
law protects minorities, then the minority-rights argument for independence is not analytically distinct. It is just an instantiation of the general
argument that independent judges are desirable because they have a higher
propensity for legalism. One could make that same argument for judicial
independence even if the law did not protect minorities.
179. Shane D’Aprile, Olson on Prop. 8 Decision: ‘That’s Why We Have an Independent
Judiciary’, Hill (Aug. 8, 2010, 9:16 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/
113185-olson-on-prop-8-decision-thats-why-we-have-judges (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Finally, the choice of judge becomes more complicated if the law is indeterminate with respect to minority rights—and it often is. As recent cases
involving same-sex marriage have shown,180 the meaning and reach of minority rights is often contestable. In cases involving ill-defined rights, an
independent judge may make a decision that protects minorities, or he may
make a decision that imposes great harm on them, more than the majority
would support, in which case a dependent judge may be better. Even if independent judges have a higher propensity for legalism, minorities and society
as a whole may prefer a dependent judge when the law is indeterminate.
C. The Determinacy of Law Is Not Dispositive
Conventional wisdom holds that as law becomes less determinate, dependent judges—particularly those responsive to mainstream values—become more desirable. For instance, Chris Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall
argue that judges often “draw upon their personal beliefs, values, and experiences in making decisions because the law is not a sufficient guide.”181 They
then argue and present evidence in favor of judicial elections. Their premise
appears to be that law is often indeterminate, which means that judges exercise policymaking discretion, making accountability important.182
Many observers embrace that logic, but it is flawed. In a variety of circumstances, the determinacy of law does not affect the optimal choice of
judge. In other circumstances, it affects the choice, but it never by itself
drives the choice.
Suppose the value of a legalistic decision exceeds the value of any nonlegalistic decision. Suppose further that independent and dependent judges
have the same propensity for legalism, and suppose that dependent judges
are more congruent with the median citizen. Here, society strictly prefers a
dependent judge. Legalistic decisions are equally likely and yield the same
payoff, regardless of the judge. Nonlegalistic decisions are equally likely, and
such decisions from a dependent judge yield a higher payoff.
In this scenario, the determinacy of law does not affect the choice of
judge. Whether law is determinate in 5 percent or 95 percent of cases is
irrelevant. There are many other scenarios in which the determinacy of law
is irrelevant to the choice of judge.183
180. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008), superseded by state constitutional amendment, Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7.5, invalidated
by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
181. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 38, at 15.
182. This is, of course, a common line of reasoning. See, e.g., id.; Scott W. Gaylord,
Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court’s Proper Support of Judicial Elections, 2011 Mich.
St. L. Rev. 1521, 1549–50.
183. If an independent judge has a higher propensity for legalism and is at least as
congruent with the median citizen as a dependent judge, or if an independent judge is more
congruent with the median citizen and has at least as high a propensity for legalism as a
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To illustrate, imagine a series of cases. In each case, the legal question is
“how must judges review laws discriminating against a particular group?” In
the first case, that group could be homosexuals, in the second Muslims, in
the third women, and so forth. As a policy matter, suppose citizens in every
case would overwhelmingly prefer the answer to be that judges must apply
strict scrutiny. If an independent and a dependent judge would be equally
likely to make legalistic decisions in those cases, whatever those may be, and
if, in the event of a nonlegalistic decision, the dependent judge would more
often select strict scrutiny, then society would prefer the dependent judge.
This is true whether there is a unique, legally correct answer in all, some, or
none of the cases.
Determinacy is not always irrelevant. It matters in one scenario: when
there is a trade-off between the judges. Suppose dependent judges have a
lower propensity for legalism but are more congruent with the median citizen. This scenario raises the trade-off discussed above. Independent judges
make fewer nonlegalistic decisions, but each decision imposes a high cost on
society. Dependent judges make more nonlegalistic decisions, but each imposes a low cost on society. Now the choice between an independent and a
dependent judge depends in part on determinacy.184
To illustrate, suppose the law becomes less determinate. Regardless of
whether a judge is independent or dependent, this change increases the likelihood of a nonlegalistic decision. Because the dependent judge is more congruent with the median citizen, his nonlegalistic decisions are better, and the
dependent judge becomes more attractive. So now when law becomes less
determinate, the optimal judge may switch from independent to dependent.
These ideas apply across legal settings. For example, some claim that law
is always determinate.185 Every case, on that account, has a single, legally
correct answer. Even if that were true, the optimal type of judge would still
depend on the propensity for legalism (how likely is each type of judge to
act in accordance with that determinate law?) and congruence with the median citizen (how costly is a deviation from that determinate law?).
Some take the opposite position and claim that law is always indeterminate.186 Equivalently for purposes of this Article, some may claim that judges
always make nonlegalistic decisions. In both scenarios, the optimal choice of
judge turns entirely on which is more congruent with the median citizen.
We usually assume that this is the dependent judge, but that need not be the

dependent judge, society strictly prefers an independent judge, regardless of the determinacy
of law. Analogous propositions hold for a dependent judge.
184. Determinacy also matters if the opposite trade-off arises: independent judges make
more nonlegalistic decisions, each imposing a low cost on average, and dependent judges make
fewer nonlegalistic decisions, each imposing a high cost on average. I briefly address that potential trade-off in Section III.E, infra.
185. E.g., Dworkin, supra note 106.
186. E.g., Anthony D’Amato, Essay, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 513 (1989).
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case. Independent judges can be widely representative, and dependent
judges can represent narrow groups.187
Finally, some claim that independent judges always make legalistic decisions in determinate cases.188 In other words, as long as the law is clear,
independent judges will follow it. Even if that were true, independent judges
would still make nonlegalistic decisions in indeterminate cases. Dependent
judges would make nonlegalistic decisions in indeterminate cases and possibly in some determinate cases. The optimal judge would still depend on,
among other factors, how often the dependent judge would make nonlegalistic decisions in determinate cases and the congruence of each judge with
the median citizen.
D. The Value of Legalism Matters
So far, I have assumed that the value of a legalistic decision exceeds the
value of any nonlegalistic decision.189 This assumption is implicit in the literature. The objective of independence, as Hamilton argued, is to “secure a
steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”190 He and others
would not embrace that position if proper “administration of the laws” did
not yield better results than nonlegalistic alternatives. In most circumstances, certainly in well-functioning democracies, the assumption seems
sensible. But it is not always enough. If the choice of judge involves a tradeoff—independent judges have a higher propensity for legalism, dependent
judges are more congruent with the median citizen191—then we must consider the size of the gap.
Suppose dependent judges are much more congruent with the median
citizen than independent judges and have only a slightly lower propensity
for legalism. So dependent judges make a few more nonlegalistic decisions
than their independent counterparts, but the social payoff of those decisions
is relatively high. Even in that circumstance, society will prefer an independent judge if a legalistic decision yields a sufficiently large payoff. Just a few
more legalistic decisions from an independent judge can generate enough
utility to offset the advantages of a dependent judge, even one closely aligned
with the median citizen.
187. Cf. Geyh, supra note 34, at 1278 (“[Do] independent judges follow the law, and if
so, how and to what extent[?] If the answer is ‘no,’ as many political scientists believe, then the
primary justification for judicial independence disappears. If law does not constrain judges in
any meaningful way—if independent judges are essentially rogue policymakers—the norms of
a democratic republic dictate that judges be brought under greater popular control, so that the
preferences judges act upon are better aligned with their ‘constituents.’ ”).
188. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Feature, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of
Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 837.
189.

In notation, l > c and l > c + a.

190. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 8, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton).
191. Or, alternatively, if independent judges have a lower propensity for legalism and
dependent judges are less congruent with the median citizen.
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Conversely, suppose dependent judges are only slightly more congruent
than independent judges with the median citizen and have a much lower
propensity for legalism. So dependent judges make many more nonlegalistic
decisions than their independent counterparts, and the social payoff of those
decisions is only slightly higher than the payoff of such decisions by independent judges. Even in that circumstance, society will prefer a dependent
judge if legalistic decisions do not generate much more utility than nonlegalistic decisions. A few more legalistic decisions from an independent judge
may not offset the advantages of a dependent judge, even one only slightly
more responsive to the median citizen.
I can state these ideas succinctly. If independent judges have a higher
propensity for legalism, then they become more desirable as the difference in
payoff between a legalistic and a nonlegalistic decision grows.
Another example may clarify. Imagine two types of cases, contract disputes and disputes involving campaign finance law. Suppose the law in the
contract disputes is always determinate, and the law in the campaign finance
disputes is always indeterminate. Compared to a dependent judge, suppose
an independent judge would make more legalistic decisions in the contract
disputes and more politically extreme decisions in the campaign finance disputes. If the value of legalistic decisions is sufficiently high—if, for example,
many actors have relied on and planned their activities around contract law,
and if a nonlegalistic decision in that area would make future contracts difficult to secure—then society would be better off with an independent judge.
The value of adhering to the law of contracts outweighs the cost of bad
decisions in campaign finance cases.
If legalistic decisions were not very valuable in contract disputes, perhaps because actors rely on social norms rather than formal law when making agreements,192 then a dependent judge would be better. The benefit of
good campaign finance policy would outweigh the cost of some nonlegalistic
decisions in contract cases.
This discussion illustrates the importance of magnitudes. If the choice
of judge involves the trade-off, with the independent judge more likely to
make legalistic decisions and the dependent judge more congruent with the
median citizen, then the question is not just whether legalistic decisions are
better than nonlegalistic decisions. The question is “how much better?”
This simple idea has important implications. Legal scholars, judges, the
Founding Fathers, and many others have forcefully defended judicial independence on the ground that independent judges are more likely to make
legalistic decisions.193 But if the choice of judge involves the trade-off, as it
sometimes must, and if legalistic decisions are not much more valuable than
192. For evidence of this, see, for example, Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992)
(discussing the diamond industry’s reliance on extralegal enforcement of business norms), and
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 55 (1963) (discussing instances of, and reasons for, failure to use contract law in the
business community).
193. See supra Part I.
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nonlegalistic alternatives, then independence is not that important—at least
not under a utilitarian conception of social welfare.
Conversely, many critics deride judicial independence.194 The rich literature in political science suggesting that federal judges, including Supreme
Court justices, make decisions on the basis of their policy preferences supports these critics’ position.195 But if the choice of judge involves the tradeoff, and if legalistic decisions are much more valuable than nonlegalistic decisions, then independent judges are still optimal. An independent judge
who sometimes follows the law and other times makes idiosyncratic and
extreme decisions may well be superior to the alternative—dependent judges
who simply follow the will of the median citizen.
This leads to two points. First, if the choice of judge involves the tradeoff, then one cannot convincingly advocate for more or less judicial independence without making explicit assumptions about the value of legalistic
and nonlegalistic decisions. Those assumptions should be context specific.
Legalistic decisions might be especially valuable, for example, in cases involving Delaware corporate law but not in cases involving New York family
law. Second, because those assumptions will necessarily be tentative, we
should be cautious about reform. No amount of evidence—for example,
that independent judges better protect minority rights or that elected judges
make decisions to attract votes—can tell us whether an independent or a
dependent judge would be better, not until we make progress on those underlying issues.
E. Independence May Be Preferable When Legalism Is Not
So far, I have assumed that the value of a legalistic decision exceeds the
value of any nonlegalistic decision. That need not be the case. Nonlegalism
may be preferable if the government is unrepresentative or corrupt, if society
changes rapidly and judges are more responsive than lawmakers, if reliance
interests are negligible, if law produces an especially unjust result in a particular case, or some combination thereof.
Recall that I treat decisions in indeterminate cases as nonlegalistic decisions. Benevolent legislators may intentionally make law indeterminate if it
is difficult to devise a good, precise rule ex ante.196 In such circumstances, a
nonlegalistic decision, even by a judge who is not congruent with the median citizen, may be preferable to a legalistic alternative.
When nonlegalism is preferable to legalism, the choice between an independent and a dependent judge still turns on the same factors as before:
propensity for legalism and congruence with the median citizen. If dependent judges have a lower propensity for legalism (they do not often follow
the harmful laws) and are more congruent with the median citizen (their
194. See supra Part I.
195. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J.
557, 566, 579–80, 599–601 (1992).
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policy preferences align with the public’s, not, for example, the repressive
government’s), society strictly prefers a dependent judge.197 If dependent
judges have a lower propensity for legalism but are less congruent with the
median citizen, then a new trade-off arises. Dependent judges make more
nonlegalistic decisions, and that is good. But those decisions do not line up
with the preferences of the median citizen, and that is bad. Independent
judges have the opposite virtue and vice.
To illustrate, suppose a repressive regime implements a law forbidding
the practice of Christianity, and suppose a person is caught practicing Christianity in his home. Suppose a judge has to decide whether to punish the
person in accordance with the law or release him. The legalistic decision—
punishing him—generates less utility than the nonlegalistic decision—releasing him. If a dependent judge would, because of pressure from the regime, be more likely to punish him, then society may oppose that judge,
notwithstanding his high propensity for legalism. If an independent judge
would likely release him, then society may prefer that judge, even though he
makes nonlegalistic decisions more often.
This raises a final point, perhaps obvious but rarely acknowledged,
about the independence debate. The case for independence is often tied to
the virtues of legalism, but it need not be. When legalism is suboptimal and
society would be better off with ad hoc rulings, an independent judge may
be best.198
F. Summary
This Part has covered a lot of ground. It may be helpful to quickly summarize its main points.
The debate about judicial independence can be reduced to two questions: How does independence affect a judge’s propensity for legalism? And
how does it affect a judge’s congruence with the median citizen? Both effects
may be positive. Independence may make judges more apt to make correct
legal decisions, and it may make their nonlegalistic decisions more congruent with the political mainstream. In that case, independent judges would be
best. It could go the other way: both effects could be negative. In that case,
dependent judges would be best. There is a third, intriguing possibility: the
first effect could be positive and the second negative.199 Independence may
197. Note also that if nonlegalistic decisions by a dependent judge have a higher payoff
than legalistic decisions, which in turn have a higher payoff than nonlegalistic decisions by an
independent judge (that is, if a > l – c), society strictly prefers a dependent judge, irrespective
of the judge’s propensity for legalism.
198. These ideas relate to points made by Kornhauser, supra note 29. He writes, “No
one values judicial independence intrinsically. . . . [I]t furthers some other, more fundamental
goal.” Id. at 50. In this section of the analysis, society values propensity for nonlegalism (because legalism is bad) and also congruence with the median citizen. Independence may promote both, one, or neither of these values depending on the circumstance.
199. There is a fourth possibility: the first effect could be negative and the second positive. See supra Section III.E. That possibility seems remote.
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make judges more apt to make legalistic decisions, but, precisely because
they are independent, it may also make their nonlegalistic decisions politically extreme.
Intuition suggests that the third circumstance often arises. When it does,
independence involves a new and fundamental trade-off. Independent
judges make more legalistic decisions, which is generally good for society.
But their nonlegalistic decisions—and there will be some—are inconsistent
with the preferences of the median citizen, which is bad. Dependent judges
have the opposite virtue and vice. Whether an independent or a dependent
judge would be optimal depends on the magnitudes of these cross-cutting
effects.
This analysis has implications for the debate about minority rights. Even
if independent judges are better at protecting minority rights, society may be
better off with a dependent judge who is more congruent with the median
citizen.
It also has implications for the debate about legal determinacy. In many
cases, the determinacy of law is irrelevant to the choice of judge. Even when
it is relevant, the choice still turns fundamentally on the two factors mentioned above.
The analysis also focuses attention on the value of legalism. To defend
independent judges on the ground that they make more legalistic decisions
is to argue that legalistic decisions are better than nonlegalistic decisions. But
we often need more. We need to know how much better.
Finally, this work drives a wedge between independence and legalism.
Even when nonlegalistic decisions are best, society may prefer an independent judge.
IV. Legal and Policy Implications
This Part broadens the horizon. I apply the ideas developed earlier to a
handful of important legal and policy topics: the separation of powers, legal
reform, and judicial selection. The objective is to show that the ideas in this
Article have implications for other debates, including practical policy
debates.
I am deliberately limiting this discussion to three topics; this Article
could have relevance for other issues. Because space is limited, and because
my focus lies elsewhere, each discussion is brief. My objective is just to
sketch some interesting applications and lay the groundwork for future
scholarship.
A. Separation of Powers
“[T]here [is no] liberty if the power of judging is not separate from
legislative power and from executive power.”200 Montesquieu’s theory was
simple: if judges are not independent of the other branches of government,
200. Montesquieu, supra note 51, at 157.
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they cannot require those branches to conform to law, including constitutional law.201 His reasoning inspired the Founders and generations of scholars to support an independent judiciary.
This Article casts new light on that venerable logic. We can understand
the central argument—independence is necessary to check the other
branches—as an instantiation of the general argument that independence
increases a judge’s propensity for legalism. That is, independent judges are
more likely to make legalistic decisions, including decisions that constrain
the other branches in accordance with law. (That may be wrong; independent judges may have a lower propensity for legalism. But suppose it is
right.) Does that mean that independent judges are better for society?
The answer is no. As discussed, the same independence that increases a
judge’s propensity for legalism may decrease the judge’s congruence with the
median citizen. In that case, we have a trade-off. Independent judges make
more legalistic decisions, including decisions that keep the other branches in
line. But their nonlegalistic decisions are costly because they are inconsistent
with mainstream values. When the second effect exceeds the first, dependent
judges would be better.
One might respond that the second effect will never exceed the first.
Properly constraining the legislature and the executive in accordance with
law must generate an enormous amount of utility, more than could be lost
through some nonlegalistic decisions by an unrepresentative judge.
But that cannot always be right, not under all circumstances. The value
of constraining the other branches must vary with the severity of those
branches’ planned infractions. A judicial decision permitting the executive
to unlawfully aggrandize itself by a small amount probably would cause less
harm than a decision permitting a large aggrandizement. On the other side
of the equation, nonlegalistic decisions can be very costly. Consider Citizens
United, the Supreme Court decision invalidating prohibitions on independent political expenditures by corporations.202 That decision is very unpopular.203 By many (but of course not all) accounts, it is nonlegalistic.204 By
many (but of course not all) accounts, it is causing great harm to American
democracy.205 It is possible that a dependent judge who permitted the Bush
201. Cf. supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
202.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

203. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on
Campaign Financing, Wash. Post (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html?sid=ST2010021702073 (“Americans of both parties overwhelmingly oppose a Supreme Court ruling that allows corporations
and unions to spend as much as they want on political campaigns . . . .”).
204. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 395 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. See, e.g., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
2010 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 55, at 8 (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/DCPD-201000055/pdf/DCPD-201000055.pdf (“[Citizens United] will open the floodgates
for special interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit in our elections.”).
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Administration to aggrandize executive power206 but came out the other way
in Citizens United would have been better for society than the independent
Supreme Court justices who did the opposite.
This short discussion begs many questions beyond the scope of this Article, but I have confidence in the bottom line. In a world where judges
sometimes make nonlegalistic decisions, judicial independence, even if it
helps to check the other branches of government, may be suboptimal.
B. Legal Reform
A variety of organizations, including the World Bank and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (“USAID”), have spent a lot of time
and money pressuring countries around the world to implement legal reforms.207 The reforms aim to enhance democracy, strengthen the rule of law,
facilitate economic growth, promote justice, and achieve other ends.208 Many
observers think that judicial independence is a critical component of these
reforms.209 Not long ago, USAID published a book-length report titled Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality.210
As this Article has shown, judicial independence can raise a trade-off.
Not the usual one—independence detracts from accountability—but a subtler one. Independence may enhance legalism at the expense of congruence
with the median citizen. Consequently, increasing judges’ independence is
not always a desirable reform.
USAID and others know that more independence is not always better.
They recognize that a certain amount of accountability is important; otherwise, “the drive for independence may go too far.”211 Still, this Article could
inform their prescriptions by focusing attention on context.
Imagine a country characterized by some anarchy and corruption. Suppose that it implements new laws and establishes a new judicial system. Now
everyone waits to see how the judges perform. If the judges make legalistic
decisions, they will send a strong signal that law is binding. That may lead to
greater respect for law, greater predictability in legal obligations, and easier
planning for citizens, among other things. Conversely, if the judges make
206. Contrast, for example, the Court’s limitation of executive power in Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004), which held that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges
by aliens held at Guantanamo Bay.
207.

Rodriguez et al., supra note 54, at 1460.

208. Id.
209. E.g., id. at 1478 (discussing reform efforts and stating that “[a] fourth institutional
structure that is viewed in much of the literature as a critical component of a system that
values and safeguards [the rule of law] is an independent judiciary”).
210. Office of Democracy & Governance, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Guidance
for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality (rev. ed. 2002), available at
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm00
7.pdf.
211. Id. at 149.
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nonlegalistic decisions, they may undermine these benefits and short-circuit
the reforms.
In this context, the judges’ propensity for legalism is critically important; much turns on their early decisions. Reform efforts should aim to maximize this propensity. Whether this means greater or lesser independence
cannot be determined in the abstract.
This example leads to some larger points. The marginal value of legalism may diminish (but remain positive) over time. Legalistic decisions in a
developing or transitioning country may generate much more utility than
identical decisions in a relatively developed, stable country. This means that
the former country may want judges with a higher propensity for legalism
than the latter country. And this means that courts in a developed country
may be poor models for courts in a transitioning country. Many have recognized this last point,212 but the analysis here shows more clearly why it is
correct.
Consider one more example. A transitioning country composed of different and sometimes-warring ethnicities implements a new constitution.
Because of the ethnic fractionalization, it is difficult to agree on the constitution, and many provisions are vague. This means that many fundamental
laws are indeterminate. When asked to interpret them, judges will have to
make nonlegalistic decisions. If these judges are incongruent with the median citizen, their nonlegalistic decisions will be costly.
This example may capture a common circumstance; law in transitioning
countries might be less determinate than law in developed, stable countries.
This means that more judicial decisions will be nonlegalistic, and reformers
should place greater weight on ensuring that judges are congruent with the
median citizen.
Where do these examples leave us? The first suggests that judges’ propensity for legalism is especially important in some transitioning countries,
and the second suggests that their congruence with the median citizen is
especially important as well. Of course, both characteristics are always important, regardless of the country. Greater independence may enhance or
detract from one or both characteristics.
This Article cannot yield answers to the difficult problems surrounding
legal reform, but it provides new tools for thinking about them in particularized settings.
C. Judicial Selection
How should we select judges? This question can be divided into two
parts: First, how independent should judges be? And second, to the extent
they are not independent, to whom should they be accountable?

212. E.g., Rodriguez et al., supra note 54, at 1493 (“[S]cholars and reformers too easily
fall into the habit of equating American governmental institutions with good legal
institutions.”).
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This Article focuses on the first of these questions, but it also sheds light
on the second. It helps us understand what we want from judicial accountability. We want it to improve judges’ congruence with the median citizen
without decreasing their propensity for legalism.213 By now, that point may
seem obvious, but the conventional debate overlooks it. To illustrate, many
contemporary observers support judicial elections as a mechanism for improving judicial accountability,214 yet they are vague about the purpose of
that accountability.215
This Article helps us see something else as well: when discussing selection mechanisms, the second question cannot be separated from the first.
Subjecting judges to partisan elections may make them more accountable to
the public, which may increase their congruence with the median citizen
(the second question). But it may simultaneously reduce their independence
(the first question). That loss in independence may decrease judges’ propensity for legalism, and the costs of that loss on society may outweigh any gains
that flow from increased congruence with the median citizen.
These ideas should look very familiar. At the beginning of this Article, I
argued that the selection debate is largely a proxy for the independence debate,216 and now we see why. In general, we want judges to do two things:
make legalistic decisions when the law is determinate and make good policy
when the law is indeterminate. In the language of this Article, we want to
maximize judges’ propensity for legalism and their congruence with the median citizen. The degree of independence we grant to judges and how we
select judges are intertwined, and both plausibly affect those judicial characteristics. The debate about selection, like the debate about independence,
can be reduced to those two factors.
Conclusion
The removal from office of three justices on the Iowa Supreme Court
probably undermined judicial independence, just as editorial pages across
the country reported. But whether their removal was bad for society is unclear. This Article presents a framework for beginning to answer that question. The framework acknowledges and transcends the thorny issues that
have long bogged down the debate about independence. It shows that we
can make progress even as we continue to disagree about underlying questions. It yields new ideas about the debate and has policy implications. It can
also be generalized.
213. Assuming, of course, that legalistic decisions yield a higher social payoff than
nonlegalistic decisions.
214. E.g., Parker, supra note 70.
215. Id. (“If judges want to be ‘super legislators,’ then they must stand before their
constituents and tell them what they believe about the Constitution . . . . [W]hen judges use
the law like Silly Putty and make themselves essentially black-robed dictators with unlimited
jurisdiction, they must be held to account.”).
216. See supra Section I.C.
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Many governmental actors perform judge-like functions, even if they
are not technically judges. Prosecutors, central bankers, attorneys general,
insurance commissioners, sheriffs, secretaries of state, school board members, officials at the World Trade Organization, and others are tasked with
correctly interpreting and applying legal rules. These same actors sometimes
make—and sometimes are required to make—nonlegalistic, policy decisions.
They make these decisions when they disagree with and skirt determinate
rules, and they are required to make them when relevant rules do not exist
or are indeterminate.
In general, we want those actors to make legalistic decisions—to do
what the law requires, however conceived—when possible. And when they
do not follow the law, or when there is no law on point, we want them to
make good policy decisions. These are the same two things we want judges
to do. And as with judges, the degree of independence we grant those other
actors can affect their ability to do both.
Consider administrative agencies like the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Securities and Exchange Commission. A voluminous literature debates the extent to which they are, and the extent to which they
should be, under the control of the political branches.217 The argument in
favor of political control is simple: agencies often make policy, and such
“decisions should be made by the most politically accountable institution
available.”218 But that control, whether exercised by the president or by Congress,219 may come at a cost. It may lead to inconsistent, arbitrary
decisionmaking.220
The framework in this Article captures and clarifies these arguments.
Making agencies more dependent on the president or Congress might increase their congruence with the median citizen. That is good insofar as the
agencies make nonlegalistic decisions. But that same dependence may undercut their propensity for legalism, and that is bad. The optimal level of
independence depends on the magnitudes of those cross-cutting factors.221
The same analysis can be applied to the rest of the legal actors mentioned above and to many others. The question of independence, as it turns
out, is not limited to judges, nor is this Article. It addresses more than the
optimal design of the judiciary. It provides tools for understanding and debating actors across the legal system.

217. For a concise summary, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of
the Bureaucracy, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 56–64 (2008).
218. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 520 (1985).
219. A large segment of literature debates whether control by the president or Congress
will maximize agency responsiveness. See Stephenson, supra note 217, at 59–64.
220. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461 (2003).
221. For a different take on optimal insulation of agencies, see Stephenson, supra note
217.
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Appendix
In the body of the Article, I assumed that independence is binary—
judges are either independent or dependent. I also assumed that, for a given
judge, decisions that deviate from determinate law yield the same payoff as
decisions in indeterminate cases. This Appendix justifies these assumptions.
I show that relaxing the assumptions complicates, but does not affect, the
analysis.
A.

Independence as a Continuous Variable

Let I represent the degree of judicial independence, where I lies in the
unit interval. Let d represent the probability that the law as applied to a case
is determinate. Let p(I) represent a judge’s propensity for legalism, or the
probability that a judge makes a legalistic decision in a determinate case. The
variable p is a function of I, where p’ > 0 (greater independence increases the
propensity for legalism) and p’’ < 0. Let l and j(I) represent the payoff of a
legalistic and a nonlegalistic decision, respectively, where l > j(I) for all I.
The variable j is a function of I, where j’ < 0 (greater independence decreases
congruence with the median citizen) and j’’ < 0. To simplify notation, p(I) is
indicated with p and j(I) with j. I, d, p, l, j ∈ [0,1].
A benevolent social planner selects the degree of independence to maximize this utility function:
(1) U = d(pl + (1 – p)j) + (1 – d)j.
The first order condition is
(2) ∂U/∂I = p’d(l – j) + j’(1 – dp) = 0.
The first term in Equation 2, p’d(l – j), is the marginal benefit of greater
independence. It represents the additional fraction of cases that will be decided legalistically because of greater independence multiplied by the difference in payoff between legalistic and nonlegalistic decisions. The second
term, j’(1 – dp), is the marginal cost of greater independence. It represents
the decrease in the payoff of nonlegalistic decisions because of greater independence multiplied by the fraction of cases that will be decided
nonlegalistically.
The second order condition is
(3) ∂2U/∂I2 = p’’d(l – j) + j’’(1 – dp) – 2dp’j’ < 0.
This condition holds when d = 0 or, if d > 0, when p’’ < (2p’j’ / (l – j)).
Now take the partial derivative of Equation 2 with respect to d:
(4) ∂2U/∂d∂I = p’(l – j) – j’p.
This cross partial is positive. Holding all else constant, this implies that
increases in the determinacy of law increase the optimal degree of independence, and vice versa.
Next, take the partial derivative of Equation 2 with respect to l:
(5) ∂2U/∂l∂I = dp’.
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This cross partial is positive. Holding all else constant, this result implies
that increases in the value of legalistic decisions increase the optimal degree
of independence.
This analysis treats independence as a continuous variable and yields the
same conclusions as the Article, or at least those parts of the Article that
assumed that (1) independence increases propensity for legalism, (2) independence decreases congruence with the median citizen, and (3) the payoff
of legalistic decisions exceeds that of nonlegalistic decisions. Parts of the Article operating under different assumptions could be supported with a similar analysis that treats independence as a continuous variable and varies p’,
j’, and so forth.
B. Nonlegalistic Decisions in Determinate and Indeterminate Cases
Assume that nonlegalistic decisions in determinate cases yield a payoff
of (j – r), and decisions in indeterminate cases yield a payoff of j. Assume
that r > 0, so nonlegalistic decisions in determinate cases yield a lower payoff
than decisions in indeterminate cases.
Now the benevolent social planner selects the degree of independence to
maximize this utility function:
(6) U = d(pl + (1 – p)(j – r)) + (1 – d)j.
The first order condition is
(7) ∂U/∂I = p’d(l – j + r) + j’(1 – dp) = 0.
This uncovers the same basic trade-off. Greater independence increases
the fraction of cases that will be decided legalistically, which increases utility
to the extent legalistic decisions yield a higher payoff than nonlegalistic decisions in determinate cases. Greater independence decreases congruence with
the median citizen, which decreases the payoff associated with all nonlegalistic decisions.
Now take the partial derivatives of Equation 7 with respect to d and l:
(8) ∂2U/∂d∂I = p’(l – j + r) – j’p.
(9) ∂2U/∂l∂I = dp’.
Both cross partials are positive. As above, this implies that increasing the
determinacy of law increases the optimal degree of independence, and increasing the payoff of a legalistic decision increases the optimal degree of
independence, and vice versa.
This analysis relaxes the assumption that the payoff of nonlegalistic decisions in determinate cases is the same as the payoff of decisions in indeterminate cases. This result may make the framework more realistic, and it may
have implications for different inquiries, but it does not affect the conclusions in this Article.

